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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the drivers of industry and aggregate merger waves from 2000 to 2019, 
with point of departure in revisiting previous research by Harford (2005). The formation of 
merger waves could be in response to fundamental economic, regulatory, or technological 
shocks, for which mergers facilitate change to the corporate environment, or due to managerial 
attempts to time the takeover market. The thesis adds value to existing research by applying 
Harford’s (2005) methods to a more recent time period, controlling for new private equity 
variables, and by investigating the size of takeover premiums over the course of the wave.  
We find that economic, regulatory, and technological shocks drive industry merger waves, but 
only when accompanied by the necessary capital liquidity to accommodate the transaction 
costs, consistent with previous research (Harford, 2005). Aggregate merger waves form when 
industry waves cluster in time. However, as many industries have become more agile, are 
already deregulated, and innovating at an increasingly faster pace making technological shocks 
more continuous, underlying economic shocks seem to have become less surprising and 
increasingly accounted for by anticipatory variables. Moreover, we find that capital raised by 
private equity funds significantly builds up prior to the waves, and that these funds participate 
in the waves on a scale that is significant in the aggregate, but not of sufficient magnitude to be 
driving them. Takeover premiums decrease over the course of the wave, as bidders fiercely 
compete for targets that best enable them to respond to the underlying shock in the initial phase 
of the wave, consistent with the neoclassical explanation of merger waves.  
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1. Introduction 
The existence of merger waves, that is, the clustering of merger activity over time with its 
transaction peaks and troughs has long been observed in the corporate takeover market (Berk 
& DeMarzo, 2017, pp. 995-996), both within industries (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996) and on an 
aggregate economic level (Harford, 2005). However, the primary drivers of merger waves have 
long been subject to debate. In fact, Brealey and Myers (1991, p. 923) coined the occurrence of 
merger waves one of the ten biggest unexplained puzzles of financial economics (Mitchell & 
Mulherin, 1996, p. 221). In the aftermath of the call for research, the last couple of decades has 
seen the emergence of two competing explanations: the neoclassical and behavioral hypothesis, 
as characterized by Harford (2005). The neoclassical hypothesis suggests waves are driven by 
industry restructuring as a response to fundamental economic, regulatory, or technological 
shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) and facilitated by sufficiently low transaction costs 
(Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006; Harford, 2005). The behavioral hypothesis claims that waves 
result from managerial attempts to exploit relatively overvalued equity to time the takeover 
market (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).  
Harford (2005) is the first to compare both neoclassical and behavioral variables. He finds that 
merger waves form in response to fundamental economic, regulatory, and technological shocks 
for which mergers facilitate change to the environment and propagate when transaction costs 
are sufficiently low to accommodate the necessary transactions. However, Harford (2005) and 
most of the available literature focuses on the 1980s and -90s. A lot has changed since then. 
Increased data availability, changing economic conditions, and increasing competition from 
financial buyers in the merger market driven by the increasing capital inflow to private equity, 
all warrant a second look at Harford’s (2005) findings.  
This thesis investigates the economic drivers of merger waves from 2000 to 2019, with point 
of departure in Harford (2005). We add value to existing research by applying Harford’s (2005) 
methods on new data and innovate by controlling for private equity variables. Albeit recent 
years have seen increasing research on investment behavior in private equity funds (Axelson 
et. al, 2009; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Buchner et. al., 2020) and their role in driving buyout 
waves (Harford et. al., 2016), little attention has been granted the role of committed capital to 
private equity in merger waves. Additionally, we investigate the evolution of takeover 
premiums over the course of the wave, which beknown to us, is largely unchartered territory in 
the context of merger waves.  
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The thesis follows the following structure: section 2 provides an extensive literature review on 
merger waves (2.1), the behavioral (2.2) and neoclassical hypothesis (2.3) as competing 
explanations for wave formations, recent developments in the field of research since Harford 
(2005) (2.4), and finally the influence of private equity and leveraged buyouts (2.5). Based on 
this review, section 3 derives research hypotheses and testable predictions that form the basis 
for the data sampled and variables constructed, as discussed in section 4. Section 5 provides an 
exhaustive discussion of methods used, findings and their robustness. Finally, section 6 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Historical Merger Waves 
A brief review of historical merger waves is warranted before researching the underlying 
drivers of the phenomena. Modern post-war economic history has seen predominantly four 
major merger waves (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017, p. 996). The peaks in takeover activity in the 
1960s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, have each been (ad-hoc) labeled according to their own 
inherent characteristics, perhaps because the drivers of the waves have been mystified (Mitchell 
& Mulherin, 1996, p. 194). The “conglomerate” wave of the 1960s is known for excessive 
conglomeration, because acquirers typically acquired firms in unrelated industries. Whether 
these acquisitions were motivated by business diversification, access to internal capital markets 
or merely a symptom of managerial hubris and “empire-building”, the idea that managerial 
expertise was easily transferable across business lines later drew skepticism, and many of the 
takeovers at the time are thought to have been value decreasing, albeit they on average were 
not detrimental to shareholder wealth (Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn, 2008, p. 4).  
As a result, the “refocusing wave” of the 1980s saw increased specialization and downsizing of 
operations, many in response to excessive conglomeration, excess capacity in the aftermath of 
the 1970s recession, or technological advancements (Betton et al., 2008, p. 5). Because the 
1980s also saw a lot of hostile takeovers, the wave is also known as the hostile or “bust-up” 
wave, in which many corporate raiders acquired poorly performing conglomerates and spun off 
its business divisions as individual assets, spawning various takeover defense mechanisms. The 
“strategic wave” of the 1990s, on the other hand, was a “friendly” wave known for global 
within-industry transactions, largely motivated by the necessary scale to compete globally 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2017, p. 996).  
Finally, the most recent wave started picking up in 2004, and saw heavy consolidation in many 
industries. The wave also saw private equity groups playing an increasingly influential role in 
the takeover market, taking ever-larger firms private, but this was brought to an abrupt end by 
the credit crunch associated with the financial crisis of 2008 (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017, p. 996). 
According to Berk and DeMarzo (2017, p. 996), takeover activity started picking up again in 
2014-15 (at least in terms of dollar value), with an all-time high of $5 trillion worth of global 
M&A deals in 2015. Such merger waves can be explained by the behavioral or neoclassical 
hypotheses. 
 Page 4 of 106  
2.2 Behavioral Hypothesis 
The behavioral hypothesis presumes that merger waves are driven by managerial attempts to 
time the takeover market, building on the observed correlation between stock market valuations 
and aggregate merger activity, as found by Golbe and White (1988), amongst others. Golbe and 
White (1988) claim to be among the first to conduct a time series analysis of merger activity. 
Working with the fragmented time series data available at the time, they use Tobin’s Q (i.e., 
the ratio of market value to the replacement cost of a listed firm) to posit a “bargain hypothesis”. 
They argue that the lower the Q ratio, the relatively cheaper (and therefore more of a bargain) 
the target is, making it more likely that an acquirer will step forward and buy the target. 
Therefore, they expect Q to be negatively related to aggregate merger activity, which in turn, 
implies a negative correlation between merger activity and market valuations (i.e., securities 
prices). To their surprise, they find the opposite, namely that merger activity is positively 
correlated with securities prices, but fail to provide an economic explanation for why that is. 
They neither consider stocks as acquisition currency in stock swaps, the access to which, 
according to more recent research by Brau and Fawcett (2006, p. 425) is the single most 
important motivator for CFOs to go public. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue the observed correlation between merger activity and market 
valuations are likely because bull markets lead groups of bidders with relatively overvalued 
stock to use their stock to buy real assets from relatively undervalued targets. The argument 
presumes target managers with short-term time horizons are prone to accept overvalued equity. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), the neoclassical hypothesis is incomplete because it 
does not explain aggregate merger waves, but rather industry-specific responses to a shock.  
Contemporaneously, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that market valuations and 
merger activity correlate because of opportunistic managerial behavior and uncertainty about 
sources of misvaluation. According to Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), rational targets 
with imperfect information are more likely to accept bids from overvalued bidders, as the 
targets are most likely to overestimate synergies in these periods. Consequently, overvaluation 
affects both deal probability and the means of exchange. When aggregate market valuations are 
high, stock swaps increase throughout the wave, implying that the proportion of cash deals are 
relatively high when market valuations are low. Contrary to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that it is the imperfect information rather than 
short time horizons that lead target managers to accept temporarily overvalued equity.  
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Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) similarly find that aggregate merger waves 
occur when market-to-book ratios (M/B) are relatively high compared to fundamental value, 
approximated by residual income models and industry multiples. They also find that “cash 
targets are undervalued relative to stock targets” while “cash acquirers are less overvalued than 
stock acquirers” (Rhodes–Kropf et al., 2005, p. 601). Albeit they recognize that the discrepancy 
between M/B ratios and fundamental value can be attributed to behavioral mispricing, or that 
merger activity spikes when growth opportunities are high and discount rates low (as claimed 
by the neoclassical view), they argue that mispricing is the most likely explanation. This is 
based on the notion that “even in industries that appear to have experienced an economic shock, 
most acquirers come from the highest misvaluation quantile” (Rhodes–Kropf et al., 2005, p. 
601). They conclude that “economic shocks could well be the fundamental drivers of merger 
activity, but misvaluation affects how these shocks are propagated through the economy” 
(Rhodes–Kropf et al., 2005, p. 601). 
Other notable contributors to behavioral merger theories include Ang and Cheng (2006) who, 
building on the findings of the abovementioned authors, find that overvalued acquirers are more 
likely to pay with stock and that acquirers in successful mergers are more overvalued than in 
withdrawn mergers. They also find that on average, the overvaluation of the stock acquirer 
exceeds the premium-adjusted overvaluation of the target. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and 
Teoh (2006) make similar findings. This is consistent with Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) findings that rational target managers are more likely to accept overvalued equity 
because they struggle to differentiate between market-specific and firm-specific sources of 
misvaluation.  
2.3 Neoclassical Hypothesis 
The neoclassical hypothesis presumes that the underlying drivers of rational merger waves is 
“an economic disturbance that leads to industry reorganization” (Harford, 2005, p. 532). This 
section reviews the most prominent neoclassical contributions leading up to Harford (2005) and 
concludes with a review of Harford’s (2005) own hallmark paper. 
The neoclassical argument can be traced back to Coase (1937), presumably one of the earliest 
to suggest that scale-increasing technological change could lead to mergers. Gort (1969, p. 627) 
posits that technological change could lead to economic disturbances generating increased 
discrepancies in firm valuations resulting in increased merger activity.  
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Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) document industry-level patterns in takeover and restructuring 
activity in the 1980s. They find significant differences in rate and clustering of activities, and 
attribute the patterns to economic, technological, or regulatory shocks. They argue that 
corporate restructurings such as mergers and leveraged buyouts are often the least-cost response 
to the industry restructuring brought about by industry shocks. Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
compare acquisitions and divestures in the 1990s and find clear clustering of both. Like Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996) they also attribute the clustering to shocks, noting that acquisition activity 
in the period was significantly higher for industries undergoing deregulation. Based on the 
notion that firms can respond to shocks by either expansion (merger) or reduction (divesture) 
of investment activities, they document that both create almost symmetrical shareholder wealth 
and is directly related to deal size. This is consistent with the synergistic restructuring narrative 
of the neoclassical hypothesis and inconsistent with behavioral models emphasizing 
“managerial hubris” (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996, p. 135). Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 
(2001) make similar findings, showing that deregulation was an important shock of the 1990s, 
with nearly half of the mergers since the 1980s being driven predominantly by deregulation. 
Andrade and Stafford (2004) extend on these arguments comparing mergers with internal 
investment decisions. They find that mergers cluster in time and industry, whereas internal 
investment decisions do not. They add to existing literature by differentiating between 
expansionary and contractionary waves. Whereas the 1970s – and 80s saw industry 
consolidation (i.e. contraction) through mergers driven by excess capacity (following the 1970s 
recession (Betton et al., 2008, p. 6)), while peak capacity utilization triggered industry 
expansion through non-merger investments, this was reversed in the 1990s. Throughout the 
‘90s, it was the profitable, high-growth, near-capacity industries that experienced the most 
intense merger activity (Andrade & Stafford, 2004). 
Contemporaneously, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001; 2002) find that merger waves facilitate 
reallocation of assets following a technological shock, in which the assets are reallocated to 
those best suited to operate the new technology, and that the wave settles when the reallocation 
is complete (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2001, p. 2), emphasized by the finding that waves will be 
shorter when the pace of technological change is more dramatic (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2001, 
p. 2). Building on valuation discrepancies and dispersion in Tobin’s Q they find that high-Q 
firms acquire low-Q firms in waves, concluding that the merger waves of the 1900s, the 1920s, 
1980s, and 1990s were probably reallocation waves, with the conglomerate wave of the 1960s 
being caused by “something else” (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2002, pp. 1, 12). 
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Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006)1 broadly interpret the cost of reallocating capital as “liquidity” and 
document that capital reallocation is procyclical. Shleifer and Vishny (1992)  make similar 
arguments in a study of the link between asset liquidity and debt capacity. They argue that asset 
liquidity is an important component of capital liquidity because asset sales propose an 
alternative way to raise cash for firms nearing financial distress. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992), mergers happen in booms because increases in cash flows simultaneously 
increase fundamental values and relax financing constraints, bridging the gap between prices 
and fundamental values. For instance, in recessions, many asset buyers are credit constrained 
and therefore unable to pay fundamental values.  
This is particularly true when considering that most assets that change hands end up in the same 
industry (Bhagat, Shleifer, Vishny, Jarrel, & Summers, 1990), such that the seller and buyer of 
the asset are likely to experience similar financial distress. This prompts the seller to await 
better times in hopes of increased asset liquidity. Similarly, when cash flows are high (and 
financing constraints relaxed), buyers can afford to pay prices close to fundamental values, 
making sellers more prone to readily part with their assets. As a result, merger activity clusters 
in time and waves occur (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992, pp. 1361-1364). The argumentation is 
emphasized by noting that the horizontal mergers typical for the 1980s were a result of relaxed 
antitrust enforcement in the U.S (Bhagat et al., 1990). Moreover, asset liquidity enables firms 
to take on more debt. In the 1980s, many loans were granted with the expectation that asset 
selloffs were necessary to meet the payments. Many of the LBO’s of the decade would therefore 
not have been possible without increased asset liquidity for divisions through carveouts and 
partial-firm acquisitions, causing increased debt capacity – an ingredient inherent to LBO’s. 
This suggests that asset liquidity seem to create debt capacity, and not the other way around 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1992, p. 1363).  
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) similarly find that industry-specific asset liquidity 
is an important determinator of asset divestures, by showing that firms with segments in 
relatively more liquid industries are more likely to conduct divestures. Additionally, among 
divesting firms, segment liquidity helps explain what assets are retained and divested 
(Schlingemann et al., 2002), consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992). The idea that 
 
1 Harford (2005) cites the working paper from 2003 that was circulating a few years before it was published in 2006. 
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transactions depend on relaxed capital constraints to occur is supported by Harford (1999) who 
finds that firms with large cash reserves are more acquisitive.  
Harford (2005) modifies the neoclassical hypothesis by introducing an overall capital liquidity 
component (the rate spread). He argues that waves occur in response to industry-specific shocks 
that necessitates large-scale reallocation of assets, as suggested by Gort (1969). However, there 
must also be sufficient capital liquidity to accommodate the reallocation. He extends this 
argument to market valuation variables traditionally claimed by the behavioral camp by arguing 
that “because higher market valuations relax financing constraints, market valuations are an 
important part of capital liquidity” (Harford, 2005, p. 533). By investigating merger activity 
between 1981 and 2000 with a transaction value of at least $50 million, he identifies 35 industry 
merger waves (Harford, 2005, p. 536). Harford (2005) initially compares behavioral and 
neoclassical variables of industry characteristics in pre-wave years with the rest of the sample, 
using a rank sum test to investigate if the variables behave as predicted by their corresponding 
hypotheses. He finds that both changes to firm fundamentals and valuation variables precede 
industry merger waves. To further investigate the drivers of the waves, he embarks on a series 
of Logit and OLS regressions in which the variables compete against each other in various 
specifications. By sequentially adding valuation and capital liquidity variables to his 
specifications and comparing them, he finds that capital liquidity subsumes the explanatory 
power of the valuation variables.  
Harford (2005, p. 530) therefore argues that the procyclical correlation between high market 
valuations and merger activity has been misattributed to behavioral misvaluation factors, since 
it only proxies for the capital liquidity effect in his models. This leads him to formally reject 
the behavioral hypothesis. Instead, he intuitively observes that “merger waves require both an 
economic motivation for transactions and relatively low transaction costs to generate a large 
volume of transactions” (Harford, 2005, p. 530). Moreover, the liquidity factor causes merger 
activity to cluster in time even if shocks do not, leading to aggregate merger waves (Harford, 
2005, p. 559). Therefore, it is the availability of capital liquidity that determines whether a wave 
propagates following a shock (Harford, 2005).  
Noting that divestures and other partial-firm acquisitions contradicts the behavioral hypothesis 
since single assets must be acquired with cash, Harford (2005) moves on to investigate if 
acquirers in partial-firm acquisitions are cash or stock bidders. He finds that stock bidders in 
mergers are also cash bidders in partial-firm acquisitions, that such transactions are increasingly 
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common during merger waves, and therefore also more likely when the rate spread is low. 
Finally, Harford (2005, p. 558) also investigates operating performance, expecting target firms 
acquired by temporarily misvalued bidders to exhibit particularly poor long-run returns, but 
finds no support for this in further tests. All these findings are consistent with the neoclassical 
hypothesis, but at odds with the behavioral.  
Since Harford’s (2005) latter tests only serves to confirm the outcome of his initial findings, we 
will for the remainder of this thesis only consider Harford’s first regression models (Harford, 
2005, pp. 530-549). Instead of applying all his tests, we focus our attention on adding value to 
his initial findings by testing them on recent data (from 2000 to 2019), controlling for new 
private equity variables, and investigating takeover premiums in conjunction with these 
findings. To accommodate these adaptations, additional reviews of relevant literature since 
Harford (2005) and the influence of private equity on merger waves are warranted.  
2.4 Research Developments in Merger Waves Since 
Harford (2005) 
To ensure the relevance of our thesis, this section provides a brief overview of recent research 
developments in the field of merger waves since Harford (2005). Recent publications in the 
field indicate that since Harford (2005), there seems to have been a shift away from explaining 
the drivers of merger waves and towards wave and deal characteristics, ranging from efficiency 
gains, bidder tactics (e.g., Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, and Thorburn (2014), Gorbenko and 
Malenko (2017)), announcement returns (Cai, Song, & Walkling, 2011; Song & Walkling, 
2000), inherent differences between financial and strategic buyers (Gorbenko & Malenko, 
2014; Martos-Vila, Rhodes-Kropf, & Harford, 2019), LBO characteristics and the influence of 
private equity, to cash effects on corporate governance and financial policies (Gao, Harford, & 
Li, 2013; Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008), to mention a few. Most of these areas are beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, for the sake of completeness we provide a brief thematical 
review of the most notable publications that followed in the aftermath of Harford (2005) 
relevant to this thesis. 
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2.4.1 Bidding Activity, Payment Method and Announcement 
Returns  
Betton et al. (2008, p. 8) find that the observable evidence is supportive of the neoclassical 
view, noting that “despite the market boom in the second half of the 1990s, the relative 
proportions of all-cash, all-stock, and mixed cash-stock offers in more than 15 000 merger bids 
did not change from the first half of the decade”. Moreover, “during the 1996-2000 period with 
peak market valuations, the sum of all-cash and mixed cash-stock equals the number of all-
stock merger bids” (Betton et al., 2008, p. 8). Both are inconsistent with the behavioral 
hypothesis.  
Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn (2018) introduce a neoclassical alternative to the bidder 
opportunism implied by the behavioral hypothesis, labeled “rational payment design”, in which 
any bidder opportunism is not driven by misvaluation (discrepancies in M/B-ratios) but 
fundamental information asymmetry. Under the rational payment design hypothesis, bidders 
choose to pay with stock not because of opportunism, but because bidders are concerned with 
adverse selection on the target side of the deal (Eckbo et al., 2018, p. 444). As a result, “the 
more correctly the target values the bidder shares, the lower is the predicted fraction of stock in 
the deal payment under bidder opportunism and the higher is this fraction under rational 
payment design” (Eckbo et al., 2018, p. 463). They find that public bidders systematically pay 
with more stock the more the target knows about the bidder, consistent with the rational 
payment design hypothesis. Interestingly, they also find that within-industry competition from 
financial acquirers exerts pressure for public (strategic) bidders to also pay in cash (Eckbo et 
al., 2018). 
Recent developments have also granted announcement returns and peer dynamics in the 
takeover market increased attention. Song and Walkling (2000) find that industry peers of initial 
acquisition targets earn abnormal announcement returns “because of the increased probability 
that they will become targets themselves”, and that this holds regardless of the form or outcome 
of the acquisition (Song and Walkling, 2000, p. 143). The returns increase with the magnitude 
of the surprise (Song & Walkling, 2000). Cai et al. (2011) further document market anticipation 
of merger bids and find that less anticipated bids earn higher announcement returns. They find 
that bidding, on average, is a wealth-creating activity, regardless of whether the target is public 
or private and the means of exchange. Interestingly, they also find that bidders earn significantly 
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higher returns in non-wave, pre-wave, and in-wave periods, but conversely negative returns in 
the post-wave period (Cai et al., 2011).  
Servaes and Tamayo (2014) study the reactions of industry peers when a company is victim to 
a hostile takeover. They find that industry peers of the takeover target respond with more 
conservative (or truthful) accounting practices, and defensive investment and capital budgeting 
policies, including reduced capital spending, free cash flow and cash holdings, and increased 
leverage and dividend payouts. They document positive peer announcement returns and that 
these are increasing in capital spending and free cash flow, indicating clear evidence of industry 
spillover effects and resource complementarities between firms (Servaes & Tamayo, 2014). 
2.4.2 Wave Participation by Strategic and Financial Bidders 
Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (2013) compare the participation of private and public firms 
in merger waves. They find that public firms are more active in merger waves than private, even 
after controlling for size and productivity. Public firms are more sensitive to credit spreads and 
market valuations, but they claim this goes beyond Harford’s (2005) findings on capital 
liquidity, by arguing that more productive firms with higher growth prospects self-select into 
going public, and later become more active in the acquisition market. This is consistent with 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) and emphasized by the finding that public firms realize higher 
productivity gains in the acquired assets than do private firms, not just because of better access 
to capital markets but also because of inherent differences in firm quality. They also show that 
high-productivity firms are more likely to buy assets and that low-productivity firms are more 
likely to sell assets, consistent with the reallocation narrative of neoclassical explanations. 
Moreover, on-the-wave acquisitions are associated with higher productivity gains, especially 
for public firms, largely driven by capital liquidity (credit spreads and market valuations) and 
the (expected) realization of synergies. This makes sense if mergers are the least-cost response 
to fundamental shocks, as claimed by the neoclassical hypothesis. 
Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) investigate maximum willingness to pay (as evident by auction 
bids) for strategic and financial bidders. They find that most targets are valued higher by 
strategic bidders, but financial bidders value mature, poorly performing companies higher, 
suggesting “different targets appeal to different types of bidders, rather than that strategic 
bidders always value targets more because of synergies” (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014, p. 
2513). This is supported by the findings that strategic valuations are more dispersed, and that 
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financial valuations are more sensitive to aggregate economic conditions (Gorbenko and 
Malenko, 2014). Gorbenko and Malenko (2017) find that cash is positively related to synergies. 
Neither Song and Walkling (2000) nor Cai, et al. (2011) investigate offer premiums over the 
course of the wave, but Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) welcome more research on the link 
between valuations and the different premiums known to be paid by strategic and financial 
bidders. 
Martos-Vila et al. (2019) argue that just as overvalued equity could lead to increased merger 
activity for strategic buyers, overvalued debt could lead to increased takeover activity for 
financial buyers. They find that financial acquirers gain a competitive advantage over strategic 
acquirers when debt markets are overvalued, and attribute this to the coinsurance effect2 and 
moral hazard. According to Martos-Vila et. al (2019), the coinsurance effect works at the 
disadvantage of the strategic buyers, because as strategic buyers combine firms, individual 
valuation errors will eventually (on average) offset each other, making overvaluation of targets 
synonymous with underestimating the coinsurance effect, de-facto enabling strategic acquirers 
to pay lower prices than their financial counterparts (Martos-Vila et al., 2019, p. 2638). 
Moreover, financial buyers in private equity (PE) are commonly associated with corporate 
governance structures providing better oversight and lower monitoring costs, making financial 
buyers better equipped to cope with managerial moral hazard, which in turn, make lenders prone 
to favor financial borrowers over strategic, effectively providing financial buyers with relatively 
better access to cheap debt, and in turn, higher willingness-to-pay (c.f. Gorbenko and Malenko, 
2014). This suggests private equity has a bigger influence on merger activity than previously 
anticipated, which brings us to the next chapter: the influence of committed capital to private 
equity (PE). 
2.5 Buyout Waves and the Influence of Private Capital 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) find that the inflow of capital to venture funds increase the 
valuation of these fund’s investments. They note that indifferences in the success rates of these 
investments suggest that it is the increased demand pressure for investments that drive prices in 
 
2 The idea that unless two projects (or firms) have perfectly correlated cash flows (correlation coefficient of unity), the merger 
will lead to increased bond prices because if one company faces financial distress costs, the excess cash flow of the other 
company can be used to pay the first company’s outstanding debt obligations, working as a “coinsurance” that effectively 
lowers the probability of bankruptcy and therefore expected bankruptcy costs to the creditors of the merged firm, resulting in 
lower interest rates. Because the coinsurance is de-facto provided by the shareholders, the rise in bond prices is accompanied 
by a drop in share prices (Higgins & Schall, 1975; Lewellen, 1971). 
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high-inflow periods, implying that investment standards are lowered in “hot” periods, only to 
be raised in “cold” periods when capital dries up. Holmström and Kaplan (2001) present similar 
findings for the leveraged buyouts (LBO) of the 1980s. 
Axelson, Strömberg, and Weisbach (2009) study the financial structure of private equity funds 
and document that private equity funds are typically structured as “finite-lived limited 
partnerships that raise equity capital from limited partners (LPs) before investments are made 
(or even discovered) and then supplement this equity financing with third-party outside 
financing” (typically leverage) on a deal-by-deal basis whenever possible (Axelson, et al., 2009, 
p. 1574). When faced with the option to raise funds ex ante (raising an entire fund to finance 
future projects), or ex post (i.e., as projects are discovered on a deal-by-deal basis), general 
partners (GPs) choose the financial structure that maximize fund value, which is usually a 
combination of the two (Axelson, et al., 2009). They model that overinvestment in good 
economic states and underinvestment in bad states amplify natural industry cycles, such that 
PE investments exhibit particularly large cyclicality. When lenders lend more aggressively, 
more marginal investments are made. This implies that an “overhang” of uninvested 
(committed) capital affects GPs willingness to take on marginal projects. Therefore, in their 
model, PE returns are negatively related to deal activity, such that fund raising and investments 
are procyclical, and returns countercyclical. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) present similar 
findings. 
Martos-Vila et al. (2019) argue that just as overvalued equity could lead to increased merger 
activity for strategic buyers, overvalued debt could lead to increased takeover activity for 
financial buyers. They find that financial acquirers gain a competitive advantage over strategic 
acquirers when debt markets are overvalued, and attribute this to the coinsurance effect3 and 
moral hazard. According to Martos-Vila et. al (2019), the coinsurance effect works at the 
disadvantage of the strategic buyers, because as strategic buyers combine firms, individual 
valuation errors will eventually (on average) offset each other, making overvaluation of targets 
synonymous with underestimating the coinsurance effect, de-facto enabling strategic acquirers 
to pay lower prices than their financial counterparts (Martos-Vila et al., 2019, p. 2638). 
 
3 The idea that unless two projects (or firms) have perfectly correlated cash flows (correlation coefficient of unity), the merger 
will lead to increased bond prices because if one company faces financial distress costs, the excess cash flow of the other 
company can be used to pay the first company’s outstanding debt obligations, working as a “coinsurance” that effectively 
lowers the probability of bankruptcy and therefore expected bankruptcy costs to the creditors of the merged firm, resulting in 
lower interest rates. Because the coinsurance is de-facto provided by the shareholders, the rise in bond prices is accompanied 
by a drop in share prices (Higgins & Schall, 1975; Lewellen, 1971). 
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Moreover, financial buyers in private equity (PE) are commonly associated with corporate 
governance structures providing better oversight and lower monitoring costs, making financial 
buyers better equipped to cope with managerial moral hazard, which in turn, make lenders prone 
to favor financial borrowers over strategic, effectively providing financial buyers with relatively 
better access to cheap debt, and in turn, higher willingness-to-pay (c.f. Gorbenko and Malenko, 
2014). This suggests private equity has a bigger influence on merger activity than previously 
anticipated, which brings us to the next chapter: the influence of committed capital to private 
equity (PE). 
2.6 Buyout Waves and the Influence of Private Capital 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) find that the inflow of capital to venture funds increase the 
valuation of these fund’s investments. They note that indifferences in the success rates of these 
investments suggest that it is the increased demand pressure for investments that drive prices in 
high-inflow periods, implying that investment standards are lowered in “hot” periods, only to 
be raised in “cold” periods when capital dries up. Holmström and Kaplan (2001) present similar 
findings for the leveraged buyouts (LBO) of the 1980s. 
Axelson et al. (2009) study the financial structure of private equity funds and document that 
private equity funds are typically structured as “finite-lived limited partnerships that raise equity 
capital from limited partners (LPs) before investments are made (or even discovered) and then 
supplement this equity financing with third-party outside financing” (typically leverage) on a 
deal-by-deal basis whenever possible (Axelson, et al., 2009, p. 1574). When faced with the 
option to raise funds ex ante (raising an entire fund to finance future projects), or ex post (i.e., 
as projects are discovered on a deal-by-deal basis), general partners (GPs) choose the financial 
structure that maximize fund value, which is usually a combination of the two (Axelson, et al., 
2009). They model that overinvestment in good economic states and underinvestment in bad 
states amplify natural industry cycles, such that PE investments exhibit particularly large 
cyclicality. When lenders lend more aggressively, more marginal investments are made. This 
implies that an “overhang” of uninvested (committed) capital affects GPs willingness to take 
on marginal projects. Therefore, in their model, PE returns are negatively related to deal 
activity, such that fund raising and investments are procyclical, and returns countercyclical. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) present similar findings. 
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2.7 Buyout Waves and the Influence of Private Capital 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) find that the inflow of capital to venture funds increase the 
valuation of these fund’s investments. They note that indifferences in the success rates of these 
investments suggest that it is the increased demand pressure for investments that drive prices in 
high-inflow periods, implying that investment standards are lowered in “hot” periods, only to 
be raised in “cold” periods when capital dries up. Holmström and Kaplan (2001) present similar 
findings for the leveraged buyouts (LBO) of the 1980s. 
Axelson et al. (2009) study the financial structure of private equity funds and document that 
private equity funds are typically structured as “finite-lived limited partnerships that raise equity 
capital from limited partners (LPs) before investments are made (or even discovered) and then 
supplement this equity financing with third-party outside financing” (typically leverage) on a 
deal-by-deal basis whenever possible (Axelson, et al., 2009, p. 1574). When faced with the 
option to raise funds ex ante (raising an entire fund to finance future projects), or ex post (i.e., 
as projects are discovered on a deal-by-deal basis), general partners (GPs) choose the financial 
structure that maximize fund value, which is usually a combination of the two (Axelson, et al., 
2009). They model that overinvestment in good economic states and underinvestment in bad 
states amplify natural industry cycles, such that PE investments exhibit particularly large 
cyclicality. When lenders lend more aggressively, more marginal investments are made. This 
implies that an “overhang” of uninvested (committed) capital affects GPs willingness to take 
on marginal projects. Therefore, in their model, PE returns are negatively related to deal 
activity, such that fund raising and investments are procyclical, and returns countercyclical. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) present similar findings. 
Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg, and Weisbach (2013) match and compare the financial 
structure of leveraged buyouts with public firms. To their surprise, they find no cross-sectional 
relationship whatsoever. Instead, whereas firm leverage for public companies is driven by firm 
characteristics, leverage in buyouts is almost entirely driven by the price and availability of 
debt. “When credit is abundant and cheap, buyouts become more levered” (Axelson et al., 2013, 
p. 2264). They document a negative relationship between buyout leverage and fund returns, 
consistent with Axelson’s, et al. (2009) model. Higher leverage is associated with higher prices 
and lower returns, suggesting GPs overpay when debt capacity is high (Axelson et al., 2013). 
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Much like Song and Walkling (2000) and Cai, et al. (2011), but in an LBO context, Harford, 
Stanfield, and Zhang (2016) study the implication of an LBO for the target firm’s industry 
peers. They find that LBOs lead merger waves and are a significant determinant of follow-on 
LBOs and within-industry strategic merger activity. Interestingly, they find that the predictive 
power of the LBO is stronger in periods of low capital liquidity, and not driven by economic or 
deregulatory shocks as traditionally associated with merger waves (Harford, 2005). The LBOs 
affect the target industry, as industry peers of the target adopt changes to investment policies 
such as increased R&D spending, enter into strategic alliances and increase defensive takeover 
provisions such as reductions in board independence and share repurchases, as a response to 
the changes it their competitive environment, consistent with Servaes and Tamayo (2014). 
Harford, et al. (2016) conclude LBOs causes and to some extent signals private information 
about optimal changes to an industry, rather than LBO sponsors self-selecting into already 
changing industries. On the other hand, Haddad, Loualiche, and Plosser (2017) find buyout 
waves form in response to declines in the aggregate risk premium and subsequently lower 
discount rates. They find the equity risk premium determines buyout booms more so than credit 
conditions, arguing that a lower equity risk premium increases the NPV of performance gains 
and reduces the cost of holding illiquid investments (such as private equity).   
Buchner, Mohamed, and Schwienbacher (2020) document “herd behavior” (i.e., the correlation 
of investment choices) amongst international buyout funds, leading to similar investment 
strategies and outcomes. They differentiate between “contemporaneous” and “following” 
herding, and find that large funds typically herd simultaneously, whereas smaller and less 
experienced funds herd as followers (i.e., with a lag) of the top players, defined as the top 
quartile in terms of committed capital. They find that herding is more common during market 
contractions and when committed capital dries up. This is consistent with the idea that fund 
managers shy away from unique (or risky) strategies in tough times because it could potentially 
hamper their ambitions to raise new funds at a later stage. This implies that capital raised by PE 
funds can cluster in both industries and time, and if the capital inflow is sufficiently large, 
therefore drive merger waves.  
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3. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Merger waves are primarily driven by neoclassical variables capturing 
economic, regulatory, and technological shocks, and sufficient capital liquidity 
Accepting the null hypothesis implies that the neoclassical hypothesis remains the most 
reasonable explanation for M&A activity clustering in waves, also in recent times. If accepted, 
industry waves form in response to underlying shocks and propagate when capital liquidity is 
sufficiently high to accommodate the transactions. Aggregate merger waves form as industry 
waves cluster in time. On the contrary, rejecting the null hypothesis would imply that we find 
support for the alternative behavioral hypothesis, suggesting merger waves result from 
managerial attempts to time the takeover market in recent decades. The hypothesis is interesting 
because there are fundamental differences in the underlying economic conditions between our 
sample period (2000 – 2019), and Harford’s (1981 – 1999) (Harford, 2005, p. 536). This affects 
both the neoclassical and behavioral variables. 
The neoclassical hypothesis might be less relevant today as manufacturing has lost its dominant 
position to services in the U. S. economy, making many industries more responsive to economic 
shocks. Moreover, increased pace of technological innovations, and advancements in research 
and development (R&D) with the emergence of open innovation models (Chesbrough, 2003), 
could make technological shocks less disruptive today compared to previous decades. Finally, 
as most industries are already deregulated, the influence of deregulation might have decreased 
since Harford (2005).  
Contrary, the behavioral hypothesis might be more relevant given that we have seen the longest 
running bull-market in history during our sample period. Moreover, if the takeover process has 
become more responsive with the digitization of financial markets, it could be easier to take 
advantage of short-lived valuation spikes to conduct acquisitions. Therefore, retesting 
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Hypothesis 2: The amount of capital raised by private equity funds is associated with aggregate 
merger waves  
Given that private equity (PE) funds are structured as limited partnerships with a finite time 
horizon they are more restricted in terms of investment timing. Contrary to strategic buyers, 
who can wait for the perfect timing of their acquisition activity, GPs are forced to conduct 
transactions following successful fundraising to generate profit before the fund is dissolved. 
Hence, PE transaction volume is largely governed by the amount of raised capital rather than 
external market conditions. High levels of fundraising should therefore precede high levels of 
M&A activity. A similar implication is found by Harford et al. (2016) who find that LBOs 
become an increasingly important determinant of merger activity in periods of low capital 
liquidity, irrespective of economic and deregulatory shocks. 
Moreover, we know that increased capital inflows to PE yield higher investment valuations 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001), fund managers herd towards 
similar investments (Buchner et al., 2020), and LBOs lead merger waves (Harford et al., 2016). 
Committed capital to PE could therefore spark, accelerate, or even drive entire within-industry 
and perhaps even aggregate merger waves if the capital influx is sufficient. This proposition is 
emphasized by increased competition for viable targets, leading GPs to ramp up the pace of 
acquisitions to compensate for reduced project quality when capital constraints loosen and put 
on the breaks when credit markets tighten (Axelson et. al, 2009; 2013). This could cause PE 
investments to exhibit particularly large cyclicality. These combined effects might work in 
tandem causing over-valued, herded, and hyped-up private equity to drive entire merger waves 
if the magnitude of committed capital is sufficiently large.  
We therefore hypothesize that committed capital has an increasingly significant explanatory 
power in the formation of merger waves. To our knowledge, this is an explanation largely left 
unaccounted for in the previous literature on merger waves. Our null hypothesis is that PE funds 
increase their fundraising prior to aggregate merger waves, while the alternative hypothesis is 
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Hypothesis 3: The average size of takeover premiums changes over the course of the wave 
Takeover premiums are surprisingly unresearched in the context of merger waves. 
Chidambaran, John, Shangguan, and Vasudevan (2010) find that premiums are higher and that 
the returns to the acquiring company shareholders are lower during merger waves, but they do 
not investigate the evolution of premiums over the course of the wave. However, we know that 
the magnitude of premiums paid by strategic and financial bidders differ on average (Gorbenko 
and Malenko, 2014) and that the relative dominance of financial and strategic acquirers 
fluctuates over the wave depending on credit and equity markets (Martos-Vila et. al, 2019; 
Haddad et. al, 2017). Coupled with the observation that LBOs lead merger waves (Harford, et. 
al, 2016), we propose that takeover premiums change over the wave. 
On the one hand, public bidders earn higher announcement returns in the pre-wave period (Cai, 
et al., 2011), suggesting the risk of overpayment is higher during and after the peak of a wave. 
This implies increasing takeover premiums towards the peak of the wave, all else equal. 
However, as the wave propagates and acquisition anticipation effects are increasingly priced in 
(c.f. Song and Walkling, 2000; Servaes and Tamayo, 2014), holding synergies and the bidder’s 
maximum willingness-to-pay fixed, this implies lower markup above the baseline market 
valuation, and in turn, decreasing premiums over the course of the wave. 
On the other hand, the fact that premiums are increasing in cash payments (Gorbenko and 
Malenko, 2017) could also suggest they are increasing in financial bids, since strategic acquirers 
have the option to pay in stocks. Moreover, financial bidders typically value their own targets 
higher than their strategic counterparts (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014; Martos-Vila, et al., 
2019), making them more likely to win the auctions in which they participate. However, this 
effect can be hard to dissect because strategic bidders tend to pay in cash to level the playing 
field with financial bidders (Eckbo et al., 2018). Therefore, the evolution of takeover premiums 
might follow from the timing of maximum PE influence over the wave (c.f. Hypothesis 2), 
which in turn is subject to aggregate economic conditions (Axelson et. al. 2009; 2013, c.f. 
Hypothesis 1).  
Finally, assuming the neoclassical hypothesis holds, bidders should compete fiercely for the 
targets that best enable them to respond to a shock. If the targets that has the highest achievable 
synergies due to their shock-responsive capabilities are acquired first, premiums might decrease 
over the wave, as decreasingly attractive targets enjoy fewer bids, driving competition down. 
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Alternatively, this effect could be counteracted by sustained competition for a decreasing 
number of available targets resulting in increasing average winning bids reflected in higher 
premiums towards the end of the wave.  
Since it is an empirical issue what effect dominates the other, our null hypothesis is that takeover 
premiums on average change over the wave, that be an increase or a decrease. The alternative 
hypothesis is that premiums remain unchanged over the course of the wave. 
3.1 Predictions 
 Table 1: Prediction Table 
 
 
This is a cause-and-effect table related to the hypotheses. The table is based on Harford (2005, p. 536), but it 
is modified to accommodate our supplementary hypotheses, variables, and tests. The table contains central 
elements and predictions of observable changes to these elements under different hypotheses, as well as the 
findings of Harford (2005), were applicable.  
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Valuations  
Table 1 summarizes expected outcomes under the different hypotheses. The neoclassical 
hypothesis predicts that economic, deregulatory, and technological shock variables and capital 
liquidity should drive out the explanatory power of both the magnitude and dispersion of M/B 
ratios in explaining industry merger waves. The M/B ratio captures the market value of a 
company relative to book value. Contrary, if the behavioral hypothesis holds, we should observe 
both increased magnitude and dispersion of pre-wave M/B ratios across industries, resulting 
from a misvaluation effect independent of capital liquidity and economic shocks. Therefore, a 
high dispersion in M/B ratio could imply that overvalued acquirers can purchase undervalued 
targets, thereby taking advantage of temporary misvaluations. 
Private Equity Capital 
In the aggregate, increasing total committed capital to private equity should precede aggregate 
merger waves. Note that dry powder, i.e., the committed capital not yet called for investment, 
is a function of the difference between capital raised and capital called over time. Thus, the 
amount of dry powder will be high in periods of high capital inflow to PE, but also in periods 
of low investment. It is therefore not a good predictor of activity due to reversed causality 
issues. However, if PE contributes to driving aggregate waves, increases in raised capital should 
precede periods of increased activity. Similarly, if PE participates in the overall aggregate 
waves, capital called should increase while dry powder depletes during aggregate merger 
waves.  
Payment Method 
Under the behavioral hypothesis, most bids by public acquirers in periods characterized by 
relatively high M/B ratios, should involve a stock offer. Therefore, the proportion of stock 
relative to cash offers should increase during merger waves. Since financial buyers such as PE 
funds can only pay in cash, the behavioral hypothesis also presumes limited influence of private 
capital on aggregate merger waves. The neoclassical hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts 
that there should be no correlation between payment method and merger waves. Finally, if PE 
is a driving force in aggregate waves, cash offers should increase during waves.  
Capital Liquidity 
For economical, technological, or deregulatory shocks to propagate merger waves, as postulated 
by the neoclassical hypothesis, the constraints on capital liquidity needs to be low when the 
shock occurs (Harford, 2005). We should therefore observe a low rate spread prior to merger 
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waves. Given that PE funds are dependent on leveraging their acquisitions to achieve 
satisfactory returns (Axelson, et al., 2009), they too should only increase activity during periods 
characterized by low capital constraints. According to the behavioral hypothesis, transactions 
are financed by overvalued equity, and we should therefore observe merger waves independent 
of rate spreads.    
Takeover Premiums 
We predict that premiums either increase or decrease if the neoclassical hypothesis holds true, 
depending on whether bidding competition is strongest during the beginning or towards the end 
of the wave. Moreover, the size of premiums could be influenced by the timing of PE 
participation in waves. If PE lead waves (Harford et. al, 2016), and financial acquirer 
participation is associated with higher premiums (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014; Martos-Vila 
et al., 2019), premiums should decrease over the wave. However, if herding by financial 
acquirers (Buchner, et al., 2020) results in increased financial buyer participation over the wave, 
premiums could increase over the wave. Alternatively, if strategic acquirers level the playing 
field by offering cash (Eckbo et al., 2018), premiums might remain unaffected by PE 
participation over the wave.  
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4. Data and Merger Wave Identification 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Criteria   
4.1.1 SDC Platinum 
Our transaction data is gathered from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Company’s (SDC) 
Platinum database. We define our selection criteria as all US target transactions between 
January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2019. Moreover, to ensure comparability of results to 
those of Harford (2005), we exclude transactions with a deal value below $50 million. The 
result is a total of 36 084 transactions, of which 23 332 are made by public acquirers and the 
remaining 12 627 by private acquirers. Relevant variables include announcement date, standard 
industry classification (SIC) code, transaction value and offer premiums, i.e., offer price relative 
to the stock price 4 weeks prior to announcement.  
4.1.2 Compustat  
Our data on company fundamentals are gathered from the Compustat North America Database 
by S&P Global Market Intelligence. Through this database we collect accounting data on all 
publicly traded companies in the US. Relevant variables include SIC codes, total asset value, 
book value of shareholders equity, revenue, net income, R&D spending, Capital Expenditures 
(Capex), number of employees, market value and stock price (end of calendar year). 
4.1.3 Preqin 
We obtain data on the private equity (PE) sector from contact with Preqin, an independent 
analytics company that specializes in alternative asset classes. Preqin has collected data within 
this sector since year 2000 and are especially renowned for their tracking of dry powder, i.e., 
committed capital that are yet to be invested by PE funds. Relevant variables include aggregate 
annual capital raised, capital called for investments and dry powder.  
4.1.4 Federal Reserve  
We use data on capital liquidity based on the Survey of Terms of Business Lending conducted 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The survey investigates gross loan 
extensions at 348 domestically chartered commercial banks and 50 U.S. branches and agencies 
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of foreign banks on a quarterly basis. In relation to the survey, they calculate and publish the 
weighted average commercial and industrial (C&I) loan rate (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2020b). Furthermore, we use the Federal Funds rate (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 2020a).  
4.2 Explanation of Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables used in regressions, i.e., the occurrence of industry and aggregate 
merger waves, and the average size of takeover premiums, will be thoroughly described and 
defined leading into models where they are relevant throughout the thesis.  
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
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As evident from Table 24, the existence of extreme outliers in many of the independent variables 
concerning company fundamentals are pulling heavily on the means. Thus, we prefer using 
medians whenever fundamentals are included in statistical models, i.e., in the rank-sum test 
 
4 One specific issue we ran into was that the total market value was only registered in Compustat from 1998. Thus, the 3-year 
return, based on market value, is missing for year 1999 and 2000. We calculate the 3-year return based on stock price and 
common shares outstanding for these specific years (c.f. Market Value (Alternative), Table 2). 
Annual Company Fundamentals gathered from Compustat. 126 548 annual observations of publicly listed 
companies between 1999 and 2019 is gathered. The table shows descriptive statistics for annual raw data, 
constructed variables, and absolute changes in constructed variables. The data presented is not winsorized or 
adjusted in any way.  
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(Table 6), merger wave regressions (Table 7 and 7,1) and premiums regressions (Table 9 and 
10).   
Deregulatory Events 
Shocks to an industry environment can also result from regulatory changes (Harford, 2005, p. 
542). Inspired by Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005), we control for the effect of 
deregulatory events in our merger wave regressions (Table 7 and 7.1). Since regulations can 
have ambiguous directional impact depending on the nature of the legislation, we only control 
for deregulatory events which by nature always improve operating conditions within the 
affected industries.  
We have based the Deregulatory Events Index  (Table 3) on industry-specific studies related to 
legislative deregulations. Sherman (2009) and Orhangazi (2014) summarizes major recent 
financial deregulations in the US. Loveland, Mulherin, Okoeguale, and Athletic (2018, p. 41) 
study the effect of deregulations on additional industries up until 2017, such as utilities and 
natural resources. Moreover, we have added deregulatory events based on recent congressional 
and presidential orders and other policy changes deemed relevant (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commisson, 1999; The White House, 2017; US Congress 115th, 2018; World Trade 
Organization, 2004). The result is 9 major deregulatory events, as evident by Table 3. This is 
significantly fewer than those found by Harford (2005), but deregulation was a particularly 
important driver of the waves in his sample, the 1980s and -90s, with the majority of highly 
regulated industries undergoing deregulation at the time (Andrade et al., 2001).  
One could argue a similar index would be warranted for technological shocks (c.f. Jovanovic 
& Rousseau, 2001; 2002) to fully account for the three drivers of the neoclassical hypothesis 
(i.e., economic, deregulatory, and technological shocks). However, technological innovations 
are more continuous by nature and therefore harder to quantify. However, Harford (2005) 
makes no such distinction. Instead, we assume that successful technological innovations are 
only successful to the extent they impact fundamental economic factors and therefore accounted 
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Table 3: Deregulatory Events and Industries Affected 
 
 
C&I Rate Spread 
As a measure of ease of financing in the economy we use the spread between the C&I loan rate 
and the federal funds rate, similar to Harford (2005). The rate spread isolates the variations in 
risk compensation demanded by lenders. Thus, it widens when lending requirements are strict, 
and narrows when financing is easily accessible. Unfortunately, publishing of the weighted 
average C&I rate was discontinued by the FED in 2017.  We will therefore make assumptions 
regarding the last two years of our sample period. In 2018, the federal funds rate increased by 
0.83 percentage points, which naturally carries over to the loan rate obtained by businesses. 
However, according to the quarterly survey of business lending, most lenders in the US reported 
eased credit terms over the year. This was largely a result of increased competition for 
borrowers, but also other considerations: 
 “In addition, significant fractions of banks mentioned a more favorable or less 
uncertain economic outlook, increased tolerance for risk, and increased 
liquidity in the secondary market for these loans as important reasons for 
easing” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2018, p. 2).  
For the surveys put forth in 2019, lenders report that credit terms remained unchanged over the 
year. The practical implication of these assumptions for our dataset is that the rate spread is 
reduced to 1.20 percent in 2018 as the increasing federal funds rate is not fully absorbed in the 
C&I rate due to ease of credit terms, while the spread is assumed to remain constant in 2019 
Industry specific deregulatory events, in the form of changes in U.S. legislations, is tabulated together with the 
year they went into effect and the FF49 industries that should be affected by the change in legislation.  
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(i.e., the entire increase in the federal funds rate was carried forward to business loans this year). 
Table 4 depicts the rate spread for every year in the sampling period. 




Private Equity Variables 
The Private Equity (PE) variables used in preliminary data exploration (Figure 4, 5 and 6) and 
in regression models (Table 7 and 7.1) are not modified. They can be found in the Appendix 
under exhibit A.1.  
 
Weighted-average effective loan rate for all commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, the federal funds rate and 
the rate spread between the two is tabulated. 
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4.3 Identification of Merger Waves 
. 
 
To identify industry-specific merger waves, we assign each acquirer and target to their 
appropriate industries based on the FF495 industry classification, as outlined by Fama and 
French (1997), based on the industries’ SIC code. Consistent with previous research (Mitchell 
& Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 2005), we set the length of industry waves to 24 months. 
The aggregate transaction activity in Figure 1 is characterized by several waves with substantial 
activity droughts following the burst of the dotcom bubble in 2000/2001 and during the 
2008/2009 financial crisis. The identification process of industry merger waves follows the 
same procedure as Harford (2005) which ensures comparability of results. First, we investigate 
whether the acquirer and target are operating within the same industry. If they are, the 
transaction will only be counted once towards merger activity in that industry. If not, the 
industry of both the target and acquirer are assigned merger activity in the given month. Thus, 
 
5 A complete list of the industries in this framework, and their corresponding SIC codes, can be found in the Appendix under 
A.15.  
Fig. 1. Aggregate merger activity, total annual transaction value to asset value and industry merger waves. 
The line represents the total annual transaction value in our SDC sample divided by total book value of assets 
from our Compustat sample (right axis). The vertical bars represent the total number of transactions with a 
minimum transaction value of $50 million (left axis). The horizontal bars represent the occurrence of industry 
merger waves.  
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we avoid double counting activity within the same industry. Note that the distinction is done on 
an industry level, and not simply by comparing SIC codes which would be too granular. The 
result is a total of 51 789 merger events in either target or acquirer industries that are not 
identical. 
We subset the activity on an industry level and calculate the number of transactions for every 
24-month period over the sample (i.e., there are 240 months in our sample, and therefore 216 
24-month intervals). Subsequently, we uniformly distribute (i.e., a distribution with equal 
probability (1/240) for a merger event taking place each month) the number of merger events 
corresponding to the total activity for that specific industry over the 20-year period. This gives 
an empirical distribution with random allocation of activity over the entire period. Next, we 
calculate the maximum occurrence of events within a 24-month period for this empirical 
distribution. The maximum occurrence is saved, and the process is repeated a thousand times. 
The result is a simulated distribution of a thousand 24-month activity maximums in a world 
where transactions occur arbitrarily. Lastly, we compare the observed real-world 24-month 
merger event concentrations to the 95th percentile of the simulated empirical distribution. If the 
actual concentration exceeds the 95th percentile of empirical maximum occurrences, the period 
is coded as a wave for that industry. The rationale is that by exceeding this empirical threshold, 
the observed concentration is too large to have occurred randomly, and therefore constitutes a 
wave spurred by some underlying drivers.   
For example, within the transportation industry, there were 1064 merger events between 
January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2019. 14 percent (amounting to 150 transactions) of these 
took place within a 24-month period starting February 1st, 2006. This proportion exceeds the 
95th percentile of the simulated empirical distribution at 13 percent with a maximum threshold 
of 138 events for any given 24-month period. Thus, this period within the transportation 
industry is characterized by abnormal M&A activity and is regarded as an industry wave. 








When repeating the process for every other industry, the result is a total of 44 industry merger 
waves within 36 separate industries. This implies that 8 of the industries has more than one 
distinct wave, as is the case for the Transportation industry (Figure 2). Within these 36 
industries, the average number of M&A events over a 24-month wave period is 224. For a non-
wave 24-month period within the same industries the average number of M&A events is 129. 
Thus, there are, on average, 74 percent more mergers occurring during a wave compared to 
non-wave periods.  
Additionally, as a benchmark inspired by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), we 
compute the total annual transaction value within an industry and compare that to the total asset 
value of all public firms within the same industry. This should increase the robustness of our 
industry merger wave findings. Transaction values are gathered from the SDC database while 
the asset values of US public firms are collected through Standard & Poor’s Compustat. We 
merge the data using SIC codes corresponding to the FF49 classification of industries as 
previously. Thus, by revisiting our previous example from the transportation industry we can 
Fig. 2. Annual M&A transactions, annual transaction value to asset value and merger waves within the 
transportation industry. The line represents the total transaction value divided by total book value of assets 
(right axis). The vertical bars represent the total number of transactions with a minimum transaction value of 
$50 million within the Transportation industry (left axis). The horizontal bars represent the periods coded as 
merger waves within this industry.  
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conclude that an average of 6.2 percent of total industry asset value is reallocated during an 
industry wave year. For the average non-wave year, the ratio sits at 4.2 percent. 






Industry Merger Waves and the corresponding start date for each wave. Furthermore, the total number of M&A 
events (if the acquirer and target reside in different industries, a transaction will be counted as an M&A event 
in both industries. If, however, they operate in the same industry the transaction only counts as one M&A event 
to avoid double counting). Thus, the total number of M&A events (51 872) are higher than the total number of 
M&A Transactions (36 084). This approach is based on the procedure outlined by Harford (2005). Annual 
industry transaction value is the sum of all deal values (where deal values were disclosed) as recorded by the 
SDC, while annual industry asset value is the sum of all asset values recorded in Compustat for the relevant 
industry. The ratio between the two therefore serves as a proxy for asset exchange rate. The transaction value 
to asset value ratio for merger wave years is the average ratio over the years included in the wave, while the 
ratio for the average year is averaged over every year included in the sample.  
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In the industries experiencing a merger wave (Table 5), we find that companies exchange an 
average of 9 percent of asset value during an average year. However, for the average industry-
wave year, this number increases to 13 percent. Hence, transaction value as a proportion of total 
asset value is 41 percent higher for the average wave-year compared to the average year. While 
this difference is not huge, these findings indicate that the selected periods likely represent 
periods of abnormally high merger activity. Like Harford (2005) we conduct a qualitative 
analysis of industry trends at the time the waves occurred, providing insights into possible 
motivations for the consolidation. The analysis can be found in the Appendix, under exhibit 
A.2.  
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5. Results  
5.1 Investigation and Exploration of Data 
5.1.1 Capital Liquidity  
The macro component proxying for capital liquidity used by Harford (2005), namely the rate 
spread, is based on previous arguments made by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Eisfeldt & 
Rampini (2006). Findings by Lown, Morgan, and Rohatgi (2000) suggest that this is a good 
proxy for the overall availability of liquidity in the economy. During a credit crunch, as loan 
standards tighten, the spread tends to increase, which is a natural consequence of lenders 
contracting credit due to increased default risk considerations (Lown et al., 2000). Just like 
Harford (2005), we do not claim that there exists a direct causal relationship between the rate 
spread and M&A activity since there are alternative ways of financing a company transaction. 
However, as Harford (2005) puts it:  
“Instead, I assert that, based on the Lown et al. paper, the rate spread may be 
used as a proxy for overall liquidity or ease of financing (in whatever form) in 
the economy” (Harford, 2005, p. 543).  
 
 




In Figure 3, the rate spread is plotted against the aggregate merger activity within our sample. 
There is an inversed relationship between them. Periods with a relatively low rate spread 
coincides with periods of relatively high transaction activity, and vice versa. These findings are 
consistent with Harford (2005) and indicate that M&A activity cluster in periods characterized 
by easy access to capital liquidity.  
Capital Liquidity and M&A Activity During the Financial Crisis 
The driving force of capital liquidity is demonstrated by the financial crisis. Although the 
financial crisis did not make its full entrance in financial markets before late 2008, credit 
constraints already started to increase in 2007. As the Fed increased rates due to widespread 
fear of inflation between 2004 and 2007, many sub-prime loans eventually defaulted (Bernanke, 
2007). As a result, major U. S. financial institutions had to write down their mortgage portfolio 
values drastically in 2007. One prominent incident was the suspension of withdrawals from two 
major hedge funds at Bear Stearns (Quental, 2007). Naturally, the collapse resulted in 
considerably tightened credit requirements across all financial institutions. The inevitable credit 
Fig. 3. Time series relationship between aggregate M&A activity, the spread between the annual weighted 
average C&I loan rate and the Federal Funds rate, annual M/B ratio and 3-year market returns. M&A activity 
is illustrated by the number of transactions annually (right). The rate spread is measured in percentage points 
(left axis). M/B-ratio is the annual median of all firms registered in our Compustat sample. S&P500 is the 3-
year compounded return of the S&P500 index plus one (left). Thus, a value of 1.5 on the left axis represents 
a spread of 1,5 percent, an M/B-ratio of 1,5 and a 3-year return on the S&P500 index of 50 percent. 
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crunch was a reality and M&A activity fell by 30 percent in the aggregate by 2008. However, 
stock transactions could still move through as the contraction in market valuations remained 
modest in the first half of 2008. By early 2009, however, the credit crunch and financial market 
crash resulted in a drop in M&A activity of 43 percent that year. Events like the financial crisis 
illustrate that the relationship between M&A and capital liquidity remains highly relevant.   
Market Collapses and Broken Correlations 
However, the interaction between the rate spread and the valuation variable, the M/B ratio, 
show some conflicting findings to those of Harford (2005). First, the correlation between the 
rate spread and the M/B ratio (the complete correlation table is available in A.3) is non-
significant (-0.28). Moreover, we do not find the same significant correlation as Harford (2005) 
for lagged changes in rate spread preceding current changes in overall M/B ratio (we find a 
correlation of -0.03 compared to Harford’s (2005) -0.38). This indicates that the inverse 
relationship between the rate spread and market valuations is less obvious in our sample period. 
The implication of this finding is that other factors than the rate spread, to a larger extent than 
in previous decades, determine market valuations.  
Historically, as credit constraints increase, economic activity and outlooks decrease, resulting 
in reductions in market values. However, the performance of “main street” (small businesses 
and investors) have been increasingly separated from “Wall Street” (major banks and financial 
institutions) over the last decades (Samuelson, 1991). To fully understand why such separation 
have occurred, we need to understand some underlying mechanics of the financial system. 
An increase in the rate spread should result in depleting economic growth and potentially higher 
risk premiums (Lown et al., 2000). Both of which should result in decreasing M/B ratios. 
However, since our sample contains two of the most severe market crashes in recent history, 
the previously significant negative correlation between the two variables have been distorted. 
By year 2000, many financial institutions had become so large and heavily intervened in the 
financial system that the Federal Reserve could not risk letting them default. They had become 
too big to fail. Thus, following the market crash, a monetary policy that enable financial markets 
to recover was implemented in the market for repurchasing agreements (repo-market). The 
repo-market is essential for the health of the modern US financial system. Every day, between 
$2 and $4 trillion is exchanged through repo-agreements were treasury bills or other highly 
liquid securities are exchanged for cash over a short period of time until they are repurchased 
along with interest (Kolchin, Podziemska, & Mostafa, 2020). Thus, those in need of cash can 
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obtain liquidity, while those holding cash reserves are able to earn interest rather than 
stockpiling.  
After a market collapse, the purchasing part in such agreements dramatically increase their 
demanded interest, and a cash crunch occurs. The federal reserve has, through legislations like 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, intervened in this cornerstone market and 
bought up financial securities following a market crash (US Congress 110th, 2008). This 
intervention floods the major financial institutions with cash, which allows them to stay afloat 
and eventually are reinvested in the market. The result is the impressive recovery of financial 
markets following the market crashes in 2000 and 2009. On “main street” however, businesses 
do not recover as quickly, and it took the US civil unemployment rate 10 years to recover to the 
pre-crisis levels of 2007 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). Therefore, we observe that the 
C&I rate spread increased from 2002 to 2004 and 2008 to 2010 while market valuations and 
returns did the same, and not the opposite. This paradoxical relationship between the rate spread 
and valuations is somewhat unique to our period compared to that of Harford (2005).  
Implications for Statistical Models 
Harford (2005) argues that the significant correlations between the capital liquidity proxy, rate 
spread, and valuations could cause issues with multicollinearity in multivariate tests. However, 
we do not observe the same significant correlations. Therefore, the influence of valuation-linked 
variables might not be captured by the liquidity proxy, as found by Harford (2005). The 
variables could therefore yield significant explanatory power simultaneously. If the valuation-
linked variables in fact are significant when included in the same model as the rate spread, they 
should provide individual explanatory power in the models (Table 7, 7.1). 
5.1.2 The Influence of Private Equity 
Increasing Capital Inflow  
The capital inflow to private equity has been steadily increasing since the turn of the millennium 
(A.1). During 2000 and 2001, $157 bn and $94 bn, respectively, were raised by private equity 
funds in the US. That increased to $303 bn and $397 bn by 2018 and 2019, respectively. Even 
though the amount of capital raised by funds are cyclical with boom-and-bust cycles, there has 
been an increasing trend in investor appetite for alternative asset classes. Similarly, the dry 
powder, i.e., committed capital yet to be invested by private equity funds, has been steadily 
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increasing from $192 bn in 2000 to $785 bn in 2019. This constitutes almost a quadrupling of 
the available capital to private equity funds over the period.  
 
 
In Figure 4, PE funds raise more money in periods of high M&A activity, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, dry powder is the result of the spread between capital raised and capital called for 
investment over time. When PE funds, on aggregate, raise more than they invest there is 
accumulation of dry powder. Such periods coincide with strong market returns and valuations 
(Figure 3). Contrary, when market conditions are unfavorable the funds are investing more than 
they raise, leading to a decreasing dry powder base. Capital called, i.e., capital invested by 
funds, follow the overall market trends in M&A, thus indicating that private equity participates 
in the aggregate M&A cycle.  
The Purchasing Power of Private Equity 
In Figure 5, we investigate the real purchasing power of private equity funds. By scaling capital 
raised and dry powder by the total market value of public companies listed in the US, inspired 
by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), we report their actual purchasing power.  
Fig. 4. Time series relationship between total M&A transactions (left), annual PE capital raised, capital called 
and build-up of dry powder in USD billions (right).  
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As evident by Figure 5, dry powder scaled by total market value and overall M&A activity has 
somewhat of an inverse relationship. The real purchasing power of private equity funds peaks 
in 2008 due to the market collapse under the global financial crisis. Subsequently, it fell rapidly 
due to a large reduction in fund raising paired with a strong recovery of market valuations. 
However, the value of private equity capital raised relative to overall market value has been 
steadily increasing ever since. Although this period is regarded as the longest running bull 
market in history, the real purchasing power of raised capital doubled between 2010 and 2019. 
As such, private equity is becoming an increasingly influential player in M&A.  
Increasing Fund Competition 
The number of active private equity funds has increased over the period (see A.1, and A.4 for 
a more detailed discussion regarding the evolution of the median PE fund over the period). 
However, the actual magnitude of their impact remains to be explored. 
Fig. 5. Time series relationship between aggregate M&A activity (left), PE dry powder scaled by total US 
market value (right axis) and annual capital raised by PE funds scaled by total US market value (right axis). 
The variables can be found in A.1.  
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In Figure 7, the share of total M&A transaction value made up of capital calls from private 
equity funds are plotted against the aggregate deal volume. There is an inverse relationship 
between the two series. The private equity proportion of deal value increases during low points 
in overall activity. This is likely a result of their limited lifetime. General partners (GPs) are 
forced to invest promptly after raising capital, irrespective of market conditions. After periods 
of strong capital inflow to private equity, such as in 2008, the GPs must invest, thereby 
increasing their share of total transaction value. However, strategic buyers seem to dominate 
aggregate M&A waves, accounting for a larger share of the total transaction value, consistent 
with Maksimovic et al. (2013). Albeit cyclical, there seems to be an increasing trend in private 
equity contributions to total transaction value. Capital called made up 6.3 percent of total 
transaction value on average during the first 5 years of the sample, and 9.9 percent during the 
last 5 years of the sample.  
5.2 Univariate Evidence 
In this section we test the relevance of the explanatory variables from Harford (2005) in our 
sample period. The variables of interest linked to the neoclassical hypothesis are supposed to 
Fig. 7. Time series relationship between aggregate M&A activity (left) and aggregate capital called for 
investment by private equity funds scaled by total annual M&A transaction value (right).  
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capture economic shocks to an industry. They are based on previous contributions by Healy, 
Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) before being formalized by 
Harford (2005). The variables include net income to sales, asset turnover (scaled by beginning-
of-period assets), R&D spending (scaled by beginning-of-period-assets), capital expenditures 
(scaled by beginning-of-period-assets), employee growth, return on assets and revenue growth. 
The scaling of variables ensures comparability across individual firms. As Harford (2005) 
points out, the M/B ratio could be considered both neoclassical and behavioral, as shocks to the 
economic conditions of a company should impact the market value. The strictly behavioral 
variables are the three-year and one-year stock returns as well as their intra-industry dispersion, 
calculated as the standard deviation of the returns.  
Since we are interested in discovering economic shocks, which we define as changes in 
fundamental conditions that has a significant effect on outcomes and/or economic performance, 
the annual change in the neoclassical variables is what we focus on. Given that there are 
fundamental differences between firms, and that relevant changes can be both positive and 
negative, we calculate the firm-specific absolute change in each variable (Table 2). As the 
behavioral variables are not capturing shocks, but rather relative valuation levels, they are not 
expressed as absolute changes. Subsequently, each firm is assigned to its appropriate industry 
based on the FF49 framework (Fama & French, 1997). After careful inspection, we winsorize 
all the firm-specific variables at the 95th percentile to avoid over-influence of outliers on our 
estimates (only mean and standard deviations as medians remains unaffected). Subsequently, 
the intra-industry annual median absolute change in the abovementioned neoclassical and 
behavioral variables are calculated. As a result, we obtain 21 (1999-2019)6 annual medians 
across 49 FF-industries for each explanatory variable7. 
Furthermore, for each of our 44 observed industry-specific merger waves we create a dummy 
variable equal to one in the year preceding the wave. Subsequently, we test for significant 
differences in the changes to fundamental conditions in the year before industries experience 
an M&A wave, and the non-wave years for the same industries. This is done through a one-
sample Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank Sum Test. This test is chosen as we are comparing non-
 
6 As some waves start in year 2000, we register observations from 1999 to facilitate lagging.  
7 On a practical note, observations on the absolute change in R&D for certain industries in certain years is missing. This is 
because no firms in these industries record R&D-spending for those years in our Compustat sample. This is either a result of 
some industries not focusing on R&D, or a result of accounting procedures, since R&D is expensed under U.S. GAAP (Bogle, 
2020). Regardless, NAs are presumed to be 0 in these cases to obtain a balanced panel. 
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parametric (i.e., non-normally distributed variables) within the same sample. The results are 
summarized in Table 6.  






Inspecting the results from Table 6 reveals several interesting findings. First, the means of the 
industry-specific medians are strikingly similar to those of Harford (2005). For instance, 
Harford (2005) reports means of 0.096 and 0.004 for asset turnover and R&D in pre-wave years. 
We find 0.098 and 0.006, respectively. This implies that the changes to company fundamentals 
preceding industry waves are largely the same today. As such, the stability of Harford’s (2005, 
p. 541) results are impressive. 
The state of neoclassical and behavioral variables in pre-wave years are summarized in this table. The 
neoclassical variables are net income margin, asset turnover, R&D, capital expenditures, employee growth, 
ROA, and revenue growth. The M/B variable is claimed by both hypotheses while the strictly behavioral 
variables are 3-year and 1-year returns and dispersion of said returns. The mean presented in the table is the 
mean of industry specific medians in industries that are experiencing a merger wave the following year. For 
each of the 36 industries experiencing waves, all the industry-year medians between 1999 and 2019 are 
ranked into quartiles. Then the mean rank over the 44 pre-wave years is presented for each variable. 
Subsequently, a Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is conducted to compare the mean rank in pre-wave years to 
a middle rank of 2.5 (
1+2+3+4
4
). The H0-hypothesis is that these ranks are not significantly different from the 
middle rank of 2.5, while the alternative hypothesis is that the explanatory variables in fact are systematically 
higher in industries about to experience merger waves. The numbers presented in brackets are the p-values 
resulting from the test. Significant p-values (at the  = 10 percent level) are highlighted in bold.  
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However, the mean rank for the industry medians suggest that our data is fundamentally 
different to that of Harford (2005). Whereas Harford (2005, p. 541) finds that virtually all the 
medians for the neoclassical variables are abnormally high (i.e., at least in the third quartile) in 
pre-wave years, we can only make the same inference for Capital Expenditures at a 10 percent 
significance level. This makes sense given that Capital Expenditures capture investments in 
new assets, primarily PP&E, to accommodate new growth opportunities. Growth opportunities, 
paired with high capital liquidity, are associated with increases in available positive NPV 
projects which in turn should spur increased M&A activity. In contrast, for the behavioral 
variables, Harford (2005) finds that neither the returns nor their dispersion is significantly 
higher in pre-wave years, whereas we find that both the returns and their dispersion are 
significantly higher in years preceding a wave, even at a 5 percent level. Our findings are more 
coherent for the M/B variables, which are claimed by both hypotheses. We find that both M/B 
ratio and its industry dispersion are significantly higher in pre-wave years. Albeit slightly lower, 
both ranking and significance are again similar to Harford’s (2005, p. 541) findings, apart from 
the change in the M/B ratio, which is not significantly different in our sample.  
In sum, these preliminary findings indicate that the behavioral variables have become 
increasingly influential, relative to Harford’s (2005) sample. The M/B variables are largely 
similar in terms of ranking, but with substantially higher means, implying the effects are more 
concentrated than before. This discrepancy could be driven by new economic trends since 
Harford (2005). For instance, increasingly immaterial assets less accounted for “on the books” 
could explain why many industries enjoy systematically higher M/B ratios today. Alternatively, 
the difference could be because our sample is heavily influenced by two major market crashes: 
the dot-com bubble burst and the financial crises. To test this presumption, we exclude the years 
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As evident by Table 6.1, the means of our modified sample are only marginally affected when 
excluding market crash years. This is because no industries, apart from Medical Equipment, 
experienced a merger wave immediately following the excluded periods. Thus, the pre-wave 
sample is largely unchanged. The ranks, however, change slightly because some of the extreme 
cases in non-pre-wave years are removed. Absolute changes in Capital Expenditures becomes 
increasingly significant. The same goes for median absolute changes to Revenue Growth which 
is now significant at the 10 percent level. This indicates changing operating conditions in an 
industry. Note that the changes are not strictly positive, since we are dealing with absolute 
changes and worsening operating conditions could result in divestures. Therefore, both positive 
and negative revenue growth could spur consolidation.  
The test and variables are identical to that of Table 6. However, the years 2000-2001 and 2008-2009 are 
excluded from the sample. These years were characterized by market crashes, i.e., the burst of the dotcom 
bubble (2000-2001) and the financial crisis (2008-2009) and could therefore impact the test largely. By 
excluding such “extreme” years it is easier to identify deviations from normal conditions in our variables. 
Significant p-values (at the  = 10% level) are highlighted in bold. 
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5.3  Regression Models 
5.3.1 Methodology 
Methodology for Industry Specific Models 
The forthcoming models attempts to uncover drivers of merger waves on both an industry level 
and in the aggregate. For the models predicting industry merger waves (Table 7, Column 1-4) 
the dependent variable, the occurrence of industry specific merger waves, is binary, i.e., 1 in 
the years an industry is experiencing the start of a merger wave and 0 otherwise. Since we want 
to follow the approach of Harford (2005), at least initially, we use a binominal logistic 
regression model (Logit). This ensures comparability of results, even though, the disadvantages 
of such a model, compared to that of a linear probability model (LPM), is that it is non-linear 
in parameters. The non-linearity makes interpretation less intuitive as the effect of marginal 
changes to explanatory variables are dependent on the base value of those variables. Because 
the original coefficients reported under this specification does not provide any interpretation 
(they are reported as log-odds), we report marginal effects at the mean on the probability of 
observing a merger wave following a one unit increase in the independent variable. 
The behavioral and neoclassical explanatory variables are the same as analyzed in Table 6. The 
model specifications of Harford (2005) involve a transformation of the seven neoclassical 
variables. A First Principal Component (PC1) analysis is conducted, resulting in a feature 
extraction by creating a new independent variable, the first principal component (PC1) 
(Kassambara, 2017).  
The PC1 is the combination of loadings in the seven neoclassical variables that can explain the 
largest possible proportion of the variance in said variables by itself. The first principal 
component captures 46 percent of the variance in the original seven neoclassical variables 
(A.5). This component is also interacted with a dummy representing tight capital years 
(characterized by annual industry median M/B ratio below the industry timeseries median and 
rate spread above the time series median). The rational for including this interaction term is that 
neoclassical shocks are less likely to propagate a wave in periods where capital liquidity is low 
(Harford, 2005).  
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Methodology for Aggregate Models 
The models predicting merger waves in the aggregate (Table 7, Column 5-7) are OLS models 
identical to those of Harford (2005). The dependent variable scales the aggregate merger 
activity from 1-3, where the numbers indicate activity in the bottom, middle or top third over 
the period (top third years can be viewed as aggregate merger wave years and are 1999-2000, 
2006-2007, 2014 and 2017-2018). The independent variables are weighted averages, based on 
firm count in each FF49 industry, of the same variables used to predict industry specific merger 
waves. The tight capital dummy is modified and now equals 1 if the weighted average annual 
M/B ratio across all industries are below its timeseries median while the rate spread is above 
its time series median, simultaneously. Deregulatory events are considered industry-specific 
and therefore excluded from the aggregate models, based on the notion that industry-specific 
deregulations are unable to affect the entire economy. Even though Harford (2005) includes 
deregulatory events on the right-hand side in his aggregate regressions, he does not elaborate 
on the process of extrapolating this variable from industry-specific into the aggregate. Thus, we 
have no way of accurately reproducing his procedure, and therefore leave the variable out of 
the aggregate models.  
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These regressions are based on those of Harford (2005) and are replicated for comparability of results (except 
for the removal of the interaction term, tight capital, in Column 4 due to issues with multicollinearity, and 
deregulatory events in the aggregate). Column 1 to 4 are logit models predicting the occurrence of industry 
specific merger waves. The panel data contains 49 industries with annual observations from 1999 to 2019. 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the first year of an industry specific merger wave. The 
explanatory variables linked to valuations, i.e., M/B, 3-year return and (3-year return), are the annual median 
company specific observations within each industry. The C&I rate spread is the difference between the annual 
weighted average C&I loan rate and the federal funds rate. The deregulatory events variable is a dummy 
indicating major industry specific deregulations (see Table 3). The neoclassical explanatory variables, i.e., 
annual absolute changes in net income margin, asset turnover, R&D spending (scaled by assets), capital 
expenditures (scaled by assets), employee growth, ROA, and revenue growth, is represented by their first 
principal component (Econ Shock Index). This component is also interacted with a dummy representing tight 
capital years (M/B ratio below the industry timeseries median and rate spread above the time series median). 
All the variables are measured at time t-1, except tight capital. Marginal effects at the mean are reported 
instead of log-odds.          
 Column 5-7 are predicting merger waves in the aggregate. The tight capital dummy is modified and 
now equals 1 if the weighted average annual M/B across industries are below its timeseries median while the 
rate spread is above its time series median, simultaneously. The remaining explanatory variables are weighted 
averages (based on firm count in each FF49 industry) of the industry specific variables. The deregulatory 
index is not included as this is an industry-specific variable that should not influence the economy as a whole. 
The dependent variable scales the aggregate number of M&A transaction from 1-3 where the numbers 
represent years in the bottom, middle and top third over the period (the top years can be regarded as wave 
years, and are 1999-2000, 2006-2007, 2014 and 2017-2018). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are 
used for all models. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.  
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Initial Findings for Industry Waves 
Table 7 presents the results. In Column 1, the model is estimated using only the M/B ratio, 
which has some explanatory power, However, it is subsumed by 3-year-return when including 
the behavioral variables (Column 2), whereas the dispersion of the return is insignificant8. This 
suggests that it is the compounding of market value that drives industry merger waves, instead 
of relative misvaluation measures as captured by a behavioral understanding of M/B and the 
dispersion in 3-year-returns. This is consistent with the neoclassical narrative, in which the M/B 
and 3-year return reflects increased valuations because of increased availability of positive NPV 
projects, including M&A, and therefore an increase in the present value of growth opportunities 
(PVGO). Albeit the M/B and 3-year return are somewhat correlated since they largely measure 
the same increase in valuations, we observe acceptable VIF-scores in the 1.1-1.5 interval (c.f. 
A.6). 
When including the strictly neoclassical variables in the specification (Column 3), the rate 
spread and deregulatory event index emerge as significantly positive drivers of industry waves. 
Since an increase in the rate spread implies a tightening of capital constraints, this is contrary 
to our own predictions and inconsistent with previous findings by Harford (2005) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992). On the other hand, the influence of deregulatory events in Column 3 and 4 
(at the 10 percent level) is strikingly similar in magnitude to Harford (2005) and consistent with 
previous findings for the 1980s and -90s by Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) and Andrade et al. 
(2001). 
Contrary to Harford (2005), the remaining neoclassical variables as captured by the economic 
shock index has no explanatory power, that be with or without the interaction of tight capital 
(Column 3-4). This is presumably because Harford’s (2005) First Principal Component 
Analysis captures more of the variation in the underlying variables than our analysis, reflecting 
fundamental differences in the underlying data for the period. Alternatively, the economic 
shock variables included in the index might have lost some of their shock-measuring 
capabilities since the 1980s and -90s, as technological advances and increased outsourcing has 
possibly made many industries more agile. For instance, a general shift in the economy from 
manufacturing to services and increased digitization coupled with an increasingly educated 
 
8 Harford (2005, p. 545) does not control for dispersion in M/B due to multicollinearity issues. To consistently replicate Harford 
(2005), we do not include the dispersion of M/B to any of the specifications in Table 7. Instead, we substitute the return 
variables for the M/B variables in Table 7.1. 
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workforce can have made many industries more shock-responsive, since assets and employees 
can more easily be repurposed. This could effectively allow companies to better adapt the way 
they do business following a shock. This would be consistent with the preliminary findings of 
the ranked sum test (Table 6), which revealed that albeit the change in the neoclassical variables 
preceding a wave was largely the same as in Harford (2005), most of the rang-sums in pre-wave 
years were no longer significantly different to the rest of the sample, indicating that economic 
shocks to industry fundamentals have become less abnormal since Harford (2005). 
Notably, in Column 4, the significance of the rate spread disappears when controlling for the 
behavioral variables and removing the interaction term with tight capital (Column 4). Separate 
specifications not reported in the table confirms that it is the exclusion of tight capital and not 
the inclusion of the behavioral variables that depletes the rate spread, suggesting that the 
interaction term disturbs or amplifies the effect of the rate spread, as it is partially a function of 
the rate spread itself. Note that when including both behavioral and neoclassical variables into 
the specification (Column 4), we do not observe the same subsumption of the behavioral 
variables by the neoclassical ones as Harford (2005), as both the 3-year return and the 
deregulatory index are simultaneously significant, while the rate spread is not. However, the 
rate spread and market returns are also somewhat correlated since the procyclical nature of the 
stock market implies that market valuations are higher when default risks are low.  
Initial Findings for Aggregate Waves 
In the aggregate (Column 5-7), the probability of merger waves increases in the M/B ratio, 
which consistent with Harford (2005), is the only of the behavioral variables with any 
explanatory power before the neoclassical variables are controlled for (Column 5). The notable 
increase in the magnitude of the coefficients in the aggregate is largely due to the scaling of the 
dependent variable, since it no longer measures wave probability, but M&A activity on a scale 
from 1 to 3.  
Unlike Harford (2005), none of the strictly neoclassical variables have any predictive power 
(Column 6). When including all variables into the specification (Column 7), 3-year return and 
its dispersion emerge as positively and negatively related to aggregate merger waves. We 
thereby observe the same reversal of the behavioral variables as in the industry models (Column 
1-2 and 4), namely that 3-year return outperforms M/B when included in the specification. The 
significant positive relationship implies the probability of aggregate merger waves increase 
when preceded by 3-years of strong market performance. Interestingly, and contrary to the 
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behavioral hypothesis, aggregate merger waves are significantly decreasing in the dispersion of 
3-year return, implying aggregate merger waves are primarily driven by high market valuations 
and not managerial attempts to exploit temporary misvaluations. Albeit we must interpret the 
specification with caution due to multicollinearity issues, this gives reason to reject the 
behavioral hypothesis, which predicts a positive relationship.  
Alternatively, the negative relationship can be interpreted as a general sign of caution when 
markets are volatile during bust periods, such as the dot com bubble or the financial crisis. The 
rate spread remains insignificant in the aggregate. Therefore, unlike Harford (2005), we cannot 
at this stage conclude that the behavioral variables only proxy for capital liquidity, neither at an 
industry level (Column 1-4), nor in the aggregate (Column 5-7). However, our findings so far 
suggest a neoclassical understanding of market returns, inconsistent with systematic 
misvaluations as presumed by the behavioral hypothesis. 
5.3.3 Robustness 
General Considerations  
The following discussion deals with threats to the validity of the above findings, and measures 
taken to ensure robustness. The variables are based on all available public firms in the 
Compustat database and should be reliable in terms of estimation accuracy. They are, however, 
biased given that these observations are of public companies only, while the merger waves 
identified through SDC data contain both private and public companies (see Table 5). Thus, our 
findings will be valid for public firms only.  
Moreover, to avoid issues with reversed causality as frequent mergers in an industry could 
affect the valuations of companies through anticipation (Song & Walkling, 2000) and industry 
spillover effects (Cai et al., 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2014), and based on the assumption that 
merger decisions are sticky, we measure the explanatory variables at time t-1. Therefore, since 
some of the waves in our sample started in year 2000, explanatory variables are recorded from 
1999. Due to issues with multicollinearity between the one and three-year returns investigated 
in Table 6, only the three-year returns, dispersion of said return and the market to book ratio is 
continued of the behavioral variables, which imitates Harford’s (2005) approach. Finally, we 
implement robust standard errors for all models (HC1). These are consistent, even in the 
presence of homoscedasticity, and are therefore always preferred. 
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Considerations Regarding Industry Specific Models  
In the models predicting industry merger waves (Table 7, Column 1-4) multicollinearity does 
not seem to constitute a threat to the power of the models based on their VIF scores (A.6, 
Column 2-4). That being said, the interaction term, tight capital, is clearly causing issues, 
resulting in wrongfully significant positive marginal effects of C&I rate spread (Table 7, 
Column 3). This is likely a result of the variable being a function of other variables included in 
the specification. Therefore, we exclude the interaction term from the full model (Table 7, 
Column 4) even though Harford (2005) does not. Moreover, the high number of observations 
in our sample is a testimony to its power. We have 44 occurrences of the least frequent outcome, 
which is industry merger wave years, compared to nearly 1000 observations of the most 
frequent outcome, namely industry non-merger wave years. Due to the sample size, we can 
assume asymptotic normality for the industry models through the Central Limit Theorem, 
which suggests the estimators follow an asymptotic standard normal distribution (Wooldrigde, 
2002, p. 767).  
Considerations Regarding Aggregate Models  
A substantial threat to the power of the aggregate models (Table 7, Column 5-7), on the other 
hand, is the small number of observations. The sample only contains 21 observations of each 
variable, one for each year in our sample. Consequently, the central limit theorem no longer 
holds (Wooldridge, 2002). Moreover, we are no longer working with panel data, but with time 
series observations. This could result in autocorrelated residuals. We therefore test for 
autocorrelation through a Durbin-Watson test (Durbin & Watson, 1950). The test does not 
detect autocorrelated residuals (see A.7), and we therefore do not implement autocorrelation-
robust standard errors. However, multicollinearity is a threat. This is confirmed by high VIF-
scores for the full model (A.6, Column 7), which makes it impossible to control for all 
observable variables and ensure robust findings, simultaneously. We later address this issue 
through a modified model in Table 7.1. 
5.3.4 Methodology Modifications  
General Methodology Modifications 
In the next section, we modify Harford’s (2005) method to mitigate the robustness issues 
discussed above and provide additional value by introducing new variables in similar 
regressions. The first modification is to drop the lagging of the C&I rate spread. Since the 
variable captures fluctuations in the risk premiums demanded by lenders over time, it is most 
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impactful at the time when the transaction moves through rather than the year prior. Reversed 
causality should not constitute an issue as it is unaffected by M&A activity. Furthermore, the 
economic shock index (the first principal component of the seven neoclassical variables) 
previously constructed to replicate Harford (2005) can be regarded as a “black box”. Under 
Harford’s (2005) specification we are unable to distinguish between the actual drivers in the 
index. We therefore unpack the index by introducing the variables individually. However, two 
of the seven neoclassical variables are excluded in the following models. First, Net Income 
Margin is dropped because it is primarily an industry characteristic. Because some industries 
naturally operate under tight margins irrespective of shocks, we find Revenue Growth more 
capable of capturing changing operating conditions in response to a shock. Second, since Asset 
Turnover and ROA captures two sides of the same coin, only ROA is carried forward in the 
following specifications.  
Methodology Modifications for Industry Specific Models 
Although we report marginal effects, the coefficients of the Logit model used by Harford (2005) 
makes for complicated interpretation, and the marginal value added by the model does not 
compensate for the added complexity. We therefore change to a Linear Probability Model 
(LPM) in our modified models (Table 7.1, Column 1-6). Additionally, there could be 
“unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities across the entities” (Hanck, Arnold, Gerber, & 
Schmelzer, 2019, p. 222), such as leverage ratios, competition, or investor perceptions of 
industries (e.g., related to environmental, social and governance (ESG) concerns). To control 
for this, we implement industry fixed effects in the full model specification (Table 7.1, Column 
6). However, due to a combination of introducing the LPM and the “unboxing” of the first 
principal component, the fit of the models as measured by their adjusted R-squared are depleted 
compared to the results in Table 7. This is particularly true for the full model (Column 6) since 
the industry fixed effects introduced implies multiple intercepts. However, the ability to 
uncover linear relationships as drivers of merger waves should be unaffected.  
Methodology Modifications for Aggregate Models 
We introduce a series of new variables related to the activity level of private equity firms (A.1). 
Aggregate capital raised by private equity funds is introduced as a potential driver of aggregate 
M&A activity, at time 𝑡 − 1 (Table 7.1, Column 10, 12). Moreover, we investigate the 
relationship between the level of dry powder held by PE funds and the capital called annually 
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by the same funds during waves (i.e., at time t) to investigate if activity is associated with 
aggregate M&A wave trends (Table 7.1, Column 11), in accordance with Hypothesis 2.   
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These regressions are based on those of Harford (2005); however, they are modified to provide additional value. 
Column 1 to 6 are LPM models predicting the occurrence of industry specific merger waves. The panel contains 
49 industries with annual observations from 1999 to 2019. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the first 
year in industry specific merger waves. The explanatory valuation linked variables, i.e., M/B and (M/B), are the 
annual median company specific observation within each industry. C&I rate spread is the annual difference 
between the weighted average C&I loan rate and the federal funds rate, i.e., equal for all industries. The 
Deregulatory Events variable is a dummy for major industry-specific deregulations (see Table 3). The neoclassical 
variables included is the annual industry median absolute change in said variables. Column 6 is fitted with industry 
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors, to control for OVB.     
 Column 7-13 predicts merger waves in the aggregate. The explanatory variables are weighted averages 
(based on firm count in each industry) of the industry specific variables. The deregulatory index is not included 
as this is an industry specific variable that should not influence the economy as a whole. The dependent variable 
scales the aggregate number of M&A transaction from 1-3 where the numbers represent years in the bottom, 
middle and top third over the period (the top third years can be regarded as wave years, and are 1999-2000, 2006-
2007, 2014 and 2017-2018). Capital raised is the aggregate capital raised by private equity funds annually the year 
prior, while Capital Called is the current capital called for investment by the same funds. Dry powder is the level 
of accumulated committed capital that has yet to be called for investment. All private equity (PE) variables are 
nominal amounts in $bn. Robust standard errors are used for all models. Standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Drivers of Industry Merger Waves 
The results are depicted in Table 7.1. As before, M/B is significant alone (c.f. Table 7). To 
further test the behavioral hypothesis, we substitute the return variables for the dispersion in 
M/B9, which has no explanatory power. This confirms our neoclassical understanding of the 
M/B ratio, since a behavioral understanding presumes that relatively overvalued bidders acquire 
relatively undervalued targets, which should have been reflected in a significant and positive 
relationship (Column 1).  
When unpacking the neoclassical variables previously merged in the Econ Shock Index (c.f. 
Table 7) in Column 2, we find that R&D and ROA emerge as significant variables. The 
probability of industry merger waves increases in changes in R&D spending but decreases in 
changes in ROA. In this specification, one unit increase in median absolute change of R&D 
spending (scaled to assets) is associated with a 197 percent increase in the probability that the 
respective industry-year is the first year of an industry merger wave10. Since the unit increase 
is in median absolute change, the economic change can be either an increase or decrease in 
R&D spending, but as for the rest of the neoclassical variables we cannot tell which one. The 
economic interpretation is therefore that R&D spending tends to change significantly in years 
preceding industry merger waves, that be positively (increase) or negatively (decrease) for 
expansionary or contractionary waves, respectively (Andrade & Stafford, 2004). Both makes 
economic sense in light of the neoclassical hypothesis. 
First, because R&D spending proxies for long-term organic growth opportunities, and R&D-
heavy firms presumably tend to be acquired in expansionary waves. Since managers face the 
choice between innovating internally through R&D spending or externally through acquiring 
innovative firms, and R&D entails huge costs whereas the potential gain is highly uncertain, 
acquiring smaller firms whose research capabilities have just proven successful could be a 
winning strategy for bigger high-growth firms. With the emergence of open innovation models 
(Chesbrough, 2003),  many knowledge-intensive industries have increasingly seen such 
outsourcing of innovation (Ozcan, 2016). Additionally, if these mergers are in response to 
underlying economic shocks as claimed by the neoclassical hypothesis, responding bidders will 
 
9 The dispersion in 3-year-return and M/B are too highly correlated to enter the specification at the same time. 
10 Note that the magnitude of the coefficient is a consequence of the linear probability model (LPM), which unlike the logit can 
predict probabilities smaller than 0 and greater than 1. Also note that since R&D is scaled to assets, a one-unit increase is 
completely unrealistic, since that implies that the median absolute change in R&D spending is an increase or decrease of 100 
percent of asset value – across the entire industry. 
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exhibit a preference for acquiring innovative firms that best allow them to respond to the shock, 
as captured by relatively higher baseline R&D spending. Since we measure median absolute 
change in R&D, but the spending is scaled to assets, such acquisitions of smaller and more 
innovative (i.e., less assets and higher R&D-spending) firms will spur greater changes in the 
medians, and therefore make both economic and econometric sense. As such, the significance 
of the R&D variable could proxy for underlying firm characteristics such as growth, which 
would also explain why it is subsumed by market-to-book, which is robust to industry fixed 
effects (Column 5-6). Significant increases in R&D spending preceding waves could also be 
symptomatic of changing investment policies as a takeover defense amongst target industry 
peers (Harford, et al., 2016; Servaes and Tamayo, 2014). 
Second, because R&D spending is a long-term capital investment and therefore likely amongst 
the first activities to undergo budget cuts in bust periods, in which managers likely prefer to 
prioritize cash flows to operating activities to keep the business afloat in the short term. 
Therefore, R&D heavy business units could potentially be acquired in contractionary industry 
waves as non-core assets are divested to ensure sufficient capital liquidity towards the end of 
the busines cycle or for firms nearing financial distress, consistent with Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992).  
Changes in ROA is negatively related to industry waves, a finding that is robust to other controls 
(Column 2-4 and 8). This is likely because ROA reflects the cash-generating ability and thereby 
attractiveness of current assets. When ROA increases, the need for acquiring new ones decrease, 
while a decrease in ROA results in increased need of acquiring new ones to avoid stranded 
assets. Moreover, as the number of underperforming incumbents in an industry becomes 
sufficiently large, this is likely to spur restructuring such as scale-increasing consolidation or 
simply divestures of non-core assets. Alternatively, ROA simply captures the flipside of the 
R&D dynamics in the sense that high R&D spending yields lower profitability and ROA, since 
R&D expenses are expensed and not capitalized under U.S GAAP (Bogle, 2020). However, 
ROA is not robust to industry fixed effects, suggesting the variable only proxies for underlying 
industry characteristics associated with high merger activity, such as high growth or low 
profitability (Column 6). This is consistent with the notion that such industries have seen 
increasing merger activity over the period. 
On an industry level, when controlling for the behavioral variables (Column 3), R&D spending 
is subsumed by the M/B ratio, which is significantly positively related to industry merger 
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waves. This is likely because M/B captures the anticipated long-term effects of R&D 
investments not yet accounted for “on the books”. This emphasized by the fact the R&D 
becomes significant again when removing M/B from the controls (Column 4). Capital 
Expenditures (CAPEX) also has some explanatory power, robust to M/B (Column 4). The 
CAPEX variable captures the investment in and maintenance of new and current assets such as 
PP&E, which is also associated with future growth opportunities, and therefore in turn make 
for attractive acquisition targets, in the event of positive changes to the medians. Similar to 
R&D, in the event of negative changes to the medians, CAPEX is also usually subject to short-
term cuts in bad times, but likely not to the same extent since CAPEX spending is necessary to 
maintain the cash generation ability of current assets and business operations. This could 
explain why CAPEX is more robust to other controls than R&D. For M/B on the other hand, 
the median is simply the median and a unit increase in M/B is therefore associated with an 
actual increased probability of industry merger waves.  
Controlling for all variables (Column 5) yields a significant and negative rate spread, consistent 
with Harford (2005). Interestingly, and contrary to our initial findings (Table 7), this 
relationship only holds when removing the lag imposed on the rate spread by Harford (2005) 
(Table 7.1). This suggests merger activity reacts faster to changes in capital constraints, or that 
the stickiness of economic decision-making has decreased with increased digitalization in the 
economy, which is perhaps amplified by the digitization of financial markets. However, unlike 
Harford (2005), the rate spread does not subsume the M/B variable which remains significant 
in all our specifications with the exemption of Column 12. The deregulation index becomes 
significantly positive when controlling for industry fixed effects (Column 6) and is again 
strikingly similar in magnitude as for previous models (c.f. Table 7), and consistent with the 
neoclassical narrative (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade, et al., 2001), and our 
presumption that deregulations only affect targeted industries. The market-to-book, the rate 
spread, and CAPEX are robust to the controls of the industry fixed effects. This is consistent 
with the neoclassical explanation for merger waves. 
Drivers of Aggregate Merger Waves 
In the aggregate (Column 7-13), M/B and the rate spread both has significant predictive power 
in separate specifications (Column 7-8), but not together (Column 9). At first, we observe the 
opposite subsumption to Harford (2005) in that the M/B outperforms the rate spread, and not 
the other way around. However, the variables are somewhat correlated since a low rate spread 
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is associated with high market valuations over the business cycle. This is reversed when the 
remaining original controls are added in Column 12, in which the rate spread subsumes the M/B 
and R&D spending remains the only significant control, now with a notably negative coefficient 
in the aggregate. This is likely because of the lagging of the variable. If changes in R&D 
correlates with the occurrence of merger waves, then lagging the variable can push the variable 
out of the peak of the wave period (where merger activity is lower), since the dependent variable 
is now the level of the aggregate merger activity on a scale from 1 to 3. As such, by nature of 
the aggregate wave, observing a year of high changes in R&D at t-1 (the year preceding the 
wave) yields lower probability that the next year is classified as a wave (i.e., a 3 on the scale), 
effectively causing aggregate merger activity to decrease in changes to R&D. Since we 
(consistent with Harford, 2005), only apply this scaling in the aggregate, in which waves are 
characterized by year and not 24-month periods as at the industry level, this could explain why 
we only observe this reversal from positive to negative R&D coefficients in the aggregate. 
Consistent with this presumption, the variable loses its significance in the aggregate when it 
enters the specification without the lag (not reported in Table 7.1). This suggests changes in 
R&D spending is not as sticky in its shock-responsiveness as initially assumed by Harford 
(2005). 
Consistent with Harford (2005), we observe that the M/B largely proxies for overall capital 
liquidity as captured by the rate spread, congruent with the neoclassical explanation of 
aggregate merger waves (Column 9, 12). However, we do not observe the same effect at the 
industry level. This is presumably because the rate spread is an economy-wide variable (i.e., 
the same across all industries), which makes the correlation with M/B by nature of the business 
cycle larger in the aggregate than at the industry level, therefore allowing for greater variation 
in M/B in the industry specifications. 
The added PE variables are all significant at a 10 percent level or less (Column 10-11). As 
predicted, capital raised the year preceding the start of the wave and capital called are positively 
related to aggregate merger waves, whereas the underutilized residual of dry powder is 
negative. Since both dry powder and capital called is a function of capital raised, these variables 
can be both drivers and the byproduct of merger activity, such that the dependent and 
independent variables mutually affect each other in the specification. We therefore lag capital 
raised to mitigate reversed causality issues. The significant positive relationship between capital 
raised in pre-wave years and merger activity (Column 10) suggests that PE firms predominantly 
raise funds ex ante, and that fundraising activity ramps up before the start of the wave as market 
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conditions improve and buyers prepare to invest, consistent with previous research (Axelson et 
al., 2009; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Column 11 intuitively suggests that dry powder builds 
up in periods of low merger activity in the economy. Capital raised is not robust to the remaining 
controls (Column 12) such as the rate spread, suggesting that PE funds actively partake in 
merger waves on a scale that is significant in the aggregate rather than driving them. This is 
consistent with previous research, which finds that merger waves are dominated by strategic 
acquirers (Martos-Vila et al., 2019), and that PE activity is subject to leverage constraints 
(Axelson et al., 2009; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). In sum, the findings support the null 
hypothesis that private capital is associated with merger waves (c.f. Hypothesis 2). 
5.3.6 Robustness  
Considerations Regarding Industry Specific Models  
This section examines threats and measures taken to ensure robustness of the above findings. 
There are several drawbacks of using a LPM, which we will address briefly. First, the predicted 
probabilities of an industry merger wave might exceed one when using the LPM as opposed to 
a Logit model. However, as Wooldrigde (2002, p. 236) puts it, “predicted probabilities outside 
the unit interval are a little troubling when we want to make predictions, but this is rarely central 
to an analysis”.  
The aim of this model is not to be predictive, i.e., to make accurate predictions of when an 
industry merger wave will occur, but rather to explain the underlying drivers of such waves. 
Although the fit of the model will decrease under an LPM model, it will allow us to investigate 
linear relationships between the variables all the same. Second, the LPM assumes constant 
partial marginal effects irrespective of the base value of independent variables. Even though it 
makes interpretation of coefficients more straight forward, it might be viewed as inaccurate. 
That being said, Angrist and Pischke (2009) compare average marginal effects of a nonlinear 
model to the constant marginal effects of the linear model and find that they are similar in 
magnitude. When comparing our findings between the Logit (Table 7, Column 1-4) and LPM 
specification (Table 7.1, Column 1-6) we find the same. Thus, this should not constitute a large 
threat to the explanatory power of our models. Finally, heteroskedasticity issues are delt with 
using robust standard errors.   
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Considerations Regarding Aggregate Models  
When estimating the aggregate models, we are dealing with a much smaller sample than on an 
industry level. The result of this is that multicollinearity is a much larger problem that could 
lead to high variance in estimates which, in turn, reduces the ability to detect statistical 
significance. We therefore have to deal with what is referred to as “bias-variance trade-off” 
(Hanck et al., 2019, p. 131). On the one hand we want to control for all observable variables to 
avoid omitted variable bias (OVB), while at the same time ensure robust findings. In addition 
to the full model specification (Table 7.1, Column 12), we therefore include a specification that 
maximizes the explanatory power through adjusted 𝑅2 (Table 7.1, Column 13) based on an 
automatic both-way stepwise variable selector in R (Venables & Ripley, 2002). Maximizing 
adjusted 𝑅2 is not the goal in itself. However, this specification will not be subject to the 
multicollinearity issues of the full model (see A.8), albeit subject to omitted variable bias. By 
estimating both we can compare findings between the two. Issues with autocorrelation (A.9) is 
discovered when Capital Raised is included alone (Table 7.1, Column 10). Therefore, we 
implement heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (HAC) for this 
specification.  
5.4 Payment Method on the Wave  
Altogether, strictly cash offers have a dominant position in our sample (A.10). Its dominance 
was established after the market crash of 2000 while the proportion of stock offers went the 
opposite direction. The slight increase in stock offers, and corresponding decrease in cash 
offers, during the financial crisis is likely a result of the credit crunch, making stock offers the 
only viable option for some acquirers. Mixed offers constituting a combination of cash and 
equity account for approximately 10 percent, and remains stable throughout the period, 
consistent with the neoclassical hypothesis. 
For the industries experiencing M&A waves (Table 5) we calculate the compositions of 
payment methods on and off these waves (A.11). We find that cash offers constitute 84 percent 
outside the wave periods, and 79 percent during the waves, on aggregate. The reduction is 
largely absorbed by stock offers, which are 4 percentage points higher during industry merger 
waves. These observations are consistent with Eckbo et al. (2018) and could be the result of a 
number of factors.  
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First, acquirers in merger waves are mainly public strategic buyers (Maksimovic et al., 2013), 
competing to answer a technological, economic or deregulatory shock, as predicted by the 
neoclassical hypothesis (Harford, 2005). Thus, the external pressure from financial and private 
acquirers offering cash is reduced, resulting in a higher probability of targets accepting stock 
offers (Eckbo et al., 2018). Second, albeit previous empirical findings suggest otherwise, it 
could also be a result of opportunistic acquirers taking advantage of high market valuations, in 
accordance with the behavioral hypothesis (Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2003), which we have shown often coincides with industry merger wave periods. There 
are however, as emphasized by Eckbo et al. (2018), a large number of considerations that 
precedes the choice of payment method. Pinpointing the exact causal relationships and 
distinguishing the effect of each potential factor is, as a result, difficult. Therefore, we cannot 
conclude any definitive support for the behavioral hypothesis based on these findings.  
Finally, the fact that cash considerations decrease during industry waves indicates a modest 
influence of private equity. Given that cash is the only viable option for PE, the proportion of 
cash considerations should increase during waves if they are a driving force, which is not the 
case. This reaffirms our previous conclusion that PE participates, but not on a sufficient scale 
to drive aggregate M&A waves.  
5.5 Inference for Hypothesis 1 and 2 
The initial data exploration, Rank-Sum tests (Table 6 and 6.1), regressions models (Table 7 and 
7.1) and the investigation of payment methods during waves create the foundation for formally 
assessing whether to accept or reject Hypothesis 1 and 2.  
First, we have tested the following null hypothesis (Hypothesis 1):  
𝐻0: Merger waves are primarily driven by neoclassical variables capturing economic, 
regulatory, and technological shocks, and sufficient capital liquidity 
 
𝐻1: Merger waves are primarily driven by managerial attempts to exploit temporary 
misvaluations to time the takeover market 
 
Based on our findings, we accept the neoclassical null hypothesis and reject the behavioral 
alternative. The neoclassical hypothesis remains the superior explanation for M&A activity 
clustering in waves on an industry and aggregate level. 
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 Second, we have tested the following null hypothesis (Hypothesis 2):  
𝐻0: The amount of capital raised by private equity funds is associated 
with aggregate merger waves 
 
𝐻1: The amount of capital raised by private equity funds is not associated 
with aggregate merger waves 
 
Based on our findings, we accept the null hypothesis. Private equity capital is associated with 
aggregate merger waves. However, the capital influx is not of sufficient scale to be driving 
them.  
5.6 Takeover Premiums 
5.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
When calculating premiums in our sample, we look at the extent to which the offer exceeds the 
market price 4 weeks prior to announcement. This is because private information and rumors 
tend to leak out to the market in the run-up period before announcement. Consequently, the 
anticipation of an imminent deal results in increasing market values and reduced announcement 
returns. One issue is the scarcity of takeover premium observations. Of the 36 084 transactions 
in our sample, only 7 294 observations on premiums were registered by the SDC. Due to the 
outliers in our sample, we winsorize the data at the 95th percentile.  
Table 8: Takeover Premiums 
 
Descriptive statistics, proportions by premium size and top FF49 industries by average premium paid.  
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5.6.2 Takeover Premiums Over the Wave  
We want to investigate how the occurrence of industry merger waves affects the takeover 
premiums over the course of the wave (Hypothesis 3). First, we allocate the target in each 
transaction to its appropriate FF49 industry. Subsequently, we subset the industries that 
experience a 24-month industry M&A wave (Table 5) and calculate the cross-sectional median 
premium paid during each of the waves 24 months. Additionally, for the targets in the same 
transactions we calculate the median M/B ratio based on market value 4 weeks prior to deal 
announcement.   
 
 
It seems that takeover premiums decrease over the course of the wave. The reason we observe 
this trend could be twofold. First, merger waves are dominated by strategic acquirers 
responding to an industry-specific shock (Maksimovic, et al., 2013; Harford, 2005). Thus, the 
targets that have shock-responsive capabilities have the highest achievable synergies and 
valuations. Because the most attractive targets are acquired during the initial phase of the wave, 
takeover premiums are highest during the first months. As the wave progresses, fewer attractive 
targets with relatively lower potential synergies remain available for acquisition, resulting in 
diminishing premiums over time. Second, as investors recognize the existence of a merger wave 
they price in the anticipation of future mergers for potential targets (Song and Walkling, 2000). 
The result is increased valuations prior to announcement, and ultimately lower bid premiums 
and announcement returns. This explanation seems plausible, yet not obvious, based on the 
Fig. 11. Monthly median takeover premiums (left axis) and monthly median M/B-ratio (right axis) for targets 
during 24-month merger waves.  
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trend in median M/B ratio towards the end of the wave (Figure 11). There is a negative 
correlation between the two variables which could illustrate that the size of offer premiums is 
governed by market valuations. This warrants further tests. 
5.6.3 Difference-in-Difference Methodology 
Methodological Hurdles 
There might be external market conditions governing the size of takeover premiums, such as 
access to capital liquidity over time. Generalizing the size of premiums in all merger wave 
periods, across the entire timeframe of the sample might therefore yield biased results. To 
mitigate this bias, we implement a difference-in-difference analysis between industries 
experiencing merger waves, as treatment group, and similar industries not experiencing a wave, 
as control group, over the same 24-month wave period. Thus, we can control for fluctuations 
over time and isolate the treatment effect of an industry wave occurring. 
The first challenge to such an approach is that by definition, industries experiencing a wave 
have more transactions taking place than industries not experiencing a wave. Thus, the number 
of observations will be relatively lower for the control group resulting in potential estimation 
biases. Furthermore, there could be issues with general equilibrium behavior between the 
groups, i.e., untreated industries adapting to the waves taking place in treated industries. 
Investors in an industry that are currently not experiencing a wave, could observe a wave taking 
place in connected industries, and subsequently anticipate that the wave will transfer to related 
industries. The anticipation will result in spillover effects on premiums to non-wave industries 
as market valuations increase in anticipation of increased bidding (Ahern & Harford, 2014; 
Song & Walkling, 2000). Similarly, if herding by financial acquirers as found by Buchner et al. 
(2020) result in increased investor interest in wave industries at the expense of non-wave 
industries, there could be feedback effects. That is, premium dynamics that would not have 
been observed if competition remained unaffected by merger waves in non-wave industries.  
Unfortunately, completely removing such threats to validity are impossible. There are, 
however, ways to ensure that the treatment and control groups are as similar in observable 
drivers of takeover premiums as possible. This is to ensure comparability between the two 
groups. Therefore, we start by investigating the observable fundamentals of an industry that 
could significantly influence the size of premiums.  
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Identifying the Right Matching Criteria 
Through use of a panel regression, we uncover fundamentals that significantly influence the 
size of the average annual industry premiums. The reason we use average rather than median 
premiums lies in the small number of observations for some industry-years. In such cases, 
average estimates will be less skewed. The explanatory variables tested are annual industry 
medians of the following fundamentals: R&D spending (scaled by assets), Assets ($M), Net 
Income Margin (%), Revenue Growth (%), Capital Expenditures (scaled by assets), Return on 
Assets (%) and M/B ratio.  
As we are working with panel data, i.e., record observations of a series of cross-sectional entities 
(49 industries) over time (2000-2019), we estimate four model specifications with increasing 
degrees of fixed effects (Wooldrigde, 2012). By implementing dummy variables for years 
(Table 9, Column 2) we exclude omitted variable bias caused by unobserved variables that vary 
over time, but are constant across industries (Hanck et al., 2019). For example, economic boom 
and bust cycles, access to capital liquidity or risk tolerance. Similarly, unobservable factors 
could vary across industries, while staying constant over time, thus affecting premiums 
differently across industries (Hanck et al., 2019). For example, high intra-industry competition 
for targets or a certain type of acquirer (strategic vs. financial) dominating the industry (Martos-
Vila et al., 2019). Therefore, we implement industry specific intercepts to mitigate this potential 
bias (Table 9, Column 3). Finally, we estimate a specification with both time and industry fixed 
effects (Table 9, Column 4). Sophisticated software packages ease the estimation and reporting 
of results (Croissant & Millo, 2008; Hlavac, 2018; Millo, 2017). 
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The matching criteria are tabulated in Table 9. The only variable that retains significance after 
controlling for time and industry fixed effects is the annual industry median R&D spending 
(scaled by assets). Thus, in years where target industries spend a large proportion of their asset 
values on R&D, they enjoy higher average premiums upon acquisition. This is consistent with 
the neoclassical hypothesis as companies that are making efforts to modernize their capabilities 
are more capable of responding to disruptive shocks, and therefore make for valuable targets. 
This regression is part of the matching procedure and seeks to uncover relevant industry characteristics to 
base the matching on. The dependent variable is the average annual premiums within each of the FF49 
industries measured in percentage points. The independent variables are the annual industry medians of 
relevant accounting metrics across all firms within each industry. Potentially relevant accounting metrics 
tested are annual industry median R&D spending (scaled by assets), Assets ($M), Net Income Margin (%), 
Revenue Growth (%), Capital Expenditures (scaled by assets), Return on Assets (%) and Market-to-book 
Ratio. Column 1 is a naive OLS without any fixed effects. Column 2 has time fixed effects through inclusion 
of year dummies. Column 3 has industry fixed effects through industry-specific intercepts. Lastly, Column 
4 has both industry and time fixed effects. All fixed effects coefficients are omitted from the table below. 
Column 1 is fitted with robust standard errors, while Column 2, 3 and 4 are fitted with clustered standard 
errors. VIF-scores can be found in the appendix (A.12). 
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The value could both be reflected in large achievable synergies as well as in winning bids being 
higher than normal due to competition for shock-responding capabilities.   
Robustness 
In this paragraph we briefly address two main concerns related to the robustness of the above 
findings. First, there are cases where no premiums are observed for certain industries in certain 
years. This results from low transaction volume combined with a high degree of missing 
observations in the SDC data. The reason for premiums not being recorded is unknown to us, 
however, we must assume that whether the value is missing is independent from the observation 
itself. As a result, we are dealing with an unbalanced panel where average annual takeover 
premiums are recorded for 774 industry-years out of the total 980. Second, the low number of 
premium observations could lead to skewed average premium estimates. However, winsorizing 
should mitigate extreme cases to some extent. As always, assumptions regarding 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are dealt with through robust and/or clustered standard 
errors.  
5.6.5 Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
Propensity Score Matching 
We use propensity score matching to create an appropriate control group based on the matching 
criteria uncovered in Table 9. The procedure ensures that we select industries that are as similar 
as possible in covariates, namely R&D spending (scaled by assets), to the industries 
experiencing waves. Thus, we aim to isolate the treatment effect to the largest extent possible. 
Our analysis will revolve around 24-month M&A waves taking place in 2006 and 2007. This 
period is selected because it has the largest concentration of industry waves in our sample (see 
Table 5), and therefore the highest probability of sufficient observations to ensure unbiased 
estimates. Before selecting control industries, we exclude those that are partially experiencing 
a merger wave in this period (a wave that ends in 2006 or starts in 2007) to ensure this group is 
independent of the treatment.  
The matching procedure starts with a logit model used to estimate the probability of an industry 
experiencing a merger wave based on R&D spending. Subsequently, for each industry 
experiencing a wave, a control industry not experiencing a wave is selected such that the global 
average absolute difference in probability of experiencing a wave is minimized for all the 
matched pairs (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2011). This procedure is referred to as optimal 
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matching, and as opposed to a greedy nearest neighbor approach where the closest match is 
selected for one pair at a time, it chooses pairs that minimizes the difference in propensity score 
across all pairs. Optimal matching has been found by Gu and Rosenbaum (1993) to outperform 
greedy alternatives, especially when the number of available controls is limited, which is a 
highly relevant concern in our case. Of the 27 available control industries, a matched control 
group containing 13 industries is selected (see A.13 for comparison of propensity score between 
the two groups). Lastly, the average premium paid during each of the 24 months of merger 
waves starting in 2006 and the matched control group over the same wave period is calculated. 




The development in average premiums for the industries experiencing a wave between 2006 
and 2007 reflect similar tendencies to the aggregate estimate presented in Figure 11. There is a 
slight negative trend towards the end of the wave. The average monthly premium is 14.3 percent 
during the first year, and 12.6 percent during the second year.  
However, we observe the same trend for the control group. Therefore, the reduction could be a 
result of other factors than the merger wave itself. As often the case when trying to implement 
a perfectly controlled experiment on an imperfect reality, there are some issues with the 
robustness of our matched control group findings. Since the number of observations are limited 
Fig. 12. Average monthly takeover premiums for industries experiencing a 24-month M&A wave, and a 
matched control group, between 2006 and 2007 (left). Moreover, the number of monthly observations for 
each group is tabulated (right).  
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in this group (Figure 12), we might have inaccurate estimates. As a result, we cannot be 
completely sure that the monthly estimate reflects the actual average premiums in these 
industries during the period.  
Valuations  
If the anticipation effect of investors, as found by Song and Walkling (2000), results in 
decreasing premiums over the wave we should observe an opposite trend in valuations. Thus, 
as the wave progresses the M/B ratio of targets should increase. In Figure 13, we test this by 
calculating the average monthly M/B ratio (based on market value 4-weeks prior to 
announcement) of targets in the transactions happening within the same treatment and control 
group used in Figure 12. 
 
 
The findings are, contrary to our expectation, that the average monthly M/B ratio of the targets 
getting acquired in the wave industries decreases over the wave. Naturally, market valuations 
are a rather complex story, and there could be many reasons for this trend apart from the isolated 
effect of merger waves. However, based on this finding we find it hard to believe that the 
decrease in premiums (Figure 12) stems solely from an anticipation effect, and needs to be 
explained by something else. Contrary, the matched control group has an increasing trend over 
the period (Figure 13), which could explain the opposite development in offer premiums for 
this group illustrated in Figure 12. 
Fig. 13. Average monthly M/B ratio (based on market value 4-weeks prior to announcement) for industries 
experiencing a 24-month wave, and a matched control sample, between 2006 and 2007 (left). Moreover, the 
number of monthly observations for each group is tabulated (right).  
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Summarizing Findings 
The finding suggests that it is the competition for targets that dictates premiums over the course 
of the merger waves between 2006 and 2007 rather than anticipation effects, all else equal. 
These findings are consistent with our “best first” hypothesis and reaffirms our belief in its 
relevancy. The most attractive targets are acquired during the initial phase of the wave due to 
their superior ability to answer neoclassical shocks. As a result, they have higher achievable 
synergies and potential value for acquirers, and therefore also higher premiums. Towards the 
end of the wave, less attractive targets with lower PVGO are available for acquisition, illustrated 
by a decreasing trend in M/B ratio, which leads to lower premiums.  
5.6.6 Methodology Modifications 
The previous difference-in-difference approach based on propensity score matching has 
inherent weaknesses. The robustness of these findings depends on subjective choices when 
selecting the relevant matching criteria. Therefore, whether the matched control sample is truly 
comparable to the treatment group is subject to bias. An alternative difference-in-difference 
approach is to formulate a fixed effects regression that isolates the effect of a merger wave on 
takeover premiums within industries, as formulated in Equation 1. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾1 𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,            (Equation 1) 
where: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡, 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖, 
𝛽𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡, 
𝛾1 𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑀&𝐴 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒 
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡, 
𝛾2 𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑀&𝐴 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡, 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡, 
 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡. 
If the treatment effect during the first and second year of a merger wave are significant when 
controlling for observable and omitted variables, we can pinpoint the effect of waves on 
premiums. Additionally, based on differences in coefficient magnitude, we can identify 
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differences in direction and magnitude of treatment effect during the beginning and towards the 
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The dependent variable is the average annual premiums (presented in percentage points) within industry i 
(FF49 industries) measured at time t (2000 – 2019). The control variables are the annual industry median 
R&D spending (scaled by assets), Assets ($M), Net Income Margin (%), Revenue Growth (%), Capital 
Expenditures (scaled by assets), Return on Assets (%) and Market-to-book Ratio. Column 1 is a naive OLS 
model without any fixed effects. Column 2, 3 and 4 are based on Equation 1 with an increasing degree of 
controls implemented. 1st Wave Year and 2nd Wave Year is the isolated treatment effect during the beginning 
and end of an M&A wave, respectively. Column 1 is fitted with robust standard errors, while Column 2, 3 
and 4 are fitted with clustered standard errors. VIF-scores based on column 1 (they are insensible with time 
and industry fixed effects) can be found in the appendix (A.14). 
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When fitting a naïve specification with observable controls, but without any fixed effects 
controlling for OVB, there is a significant negative coefficient during the second year implying 
that industries experiencing a wave exhibit lower premiums towards the end of the wave 
(Column 1). As we introduce industry and time fixed effects, and an increasing number of 
observable control variables, throughout Column 2 to 4, the negative direction and magnitude 
of the coefficient (mostly) remain largest for the second year. This indicates that premiums in 
fact are lower during the second year of a wave, and hence, decreasing. However, when 
implementing all observable control variables, and controlling for time and industry fixed 
effects, we cannot statistically prove this with sufficient significance (Column 4). Even though 
the lack of robustness forces us to conclude with caution, decreasing premiums over the course 
of the wave seems likely.  
5.7 Inference for Hypothesis 3 
The development in monthly median takeover premiums during waves (Figure 11), compared 
to the average monthly offer premiums in wave industries to a matched control sample (Figure 
12), and the difference-in-difference panel regression (Table 10) gives basis for formally 
assessing whether to accept or reject Hypothesis 3. 
We have tested the following null hypothesis (Hypothesis 3):  
𝐻0: The average size of takeover premiums changes over the course of the wave 
 
𝐻1: The average size of takeover premiums remains unaffected by industry merger waves 
 
 
In sum, based on the findings in this section, we accept the null hypothesis. The average size of 
takeover premiums changes over the course of the wave, and more specifically decrease. The 
decrease is likely a result of the most attractive targets being acquired during the initial phase 
due to their shock-responsive capabilities to neoclassical shocks. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis we investigate the empirical drivers of merger waves from 2000-2019. We do this 
with point of departure in Harford’s (2005) iconic paper, who largely settled the academic 
dispute between neoclassical and behavioral scholars. Most academic research on merger 
waves, including Harford (2005), is based on data from the 1980s and 90s. A lot has changed 
since then. Increased data availability, changing economic conditions and increased 
competition from financial buyers such as private equity funds all warrant a second look at 
Harford’s (2005) findings. We therefore add value to existing research by testing Harford’s 
(2005) methods on new data from 2000 to 2019 and by controlling for new private equity 
variables. Additionally, we add value by investigating the evolution of takeover premiums over 
the course of the wave, which beknown to us, is largely unchartered territory in the context of 
merger waves. We provide an extensive review of existing literature for both the neoclassical 
and behavioral hypothesis, research developments since Harford (2005) and the influence of 
private equity on merger waves. Based on this review, we formulate 3 hypotheses. First, we 
hypothesize that economic, regulatory, and technological shocks enabled by sufficient capital 
liquidity still drive industry merger waves, and that aggregate waves form as industry waves 
cluster in time, consistent with the neoclassical hypothesis (Harford, 2005).  Second, that the 
amount of capital inflow to PE funds is associated with aggregate merger waves, and third, that 
the size of takeover premiums changes over the course of the wave. 
When replicating Harford (2005) (Table 7) to test the first hypothesis, we initially find that 
industry merger waves are no longer driven by the first principal component of economic shock 
variables and the relaxation of capital constraints, but by deregulation and market returns. 
Aggregate waves are driven by market returns, but decrease in the dispersion of these returns, 
inconsistent with the behavioral hypothesis but consistent with a neoclassical understanding of 
market performance and efficient markets. This suggests that albeit some economic variables 
have lost their explanatory power, both industry and aggregate merger waves form in response 
to fundamental shocks to the economy, as claimed by the neoclassical hypothesis. However, 
the role of sufficient capital liquidity to facilitate the necessary reallocation of assets in response 
to the shock has become less prominent than before (c.f. Harford, 2005).  
When modifying Harford’s (2005) approach by unpacking the economic variables to better 
understand the underlying drivers (Table 7.1), we find that the relaxation of capital constraints 
and deregulation drive industry merger waves, consistent with previous research (Mitchell and 
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Mulherin, 1996; Andrade et. al., 2001; Harford, 2005). The significance of capital liquidity only 
holds when removing the lag imposed by Harford (2005) on the C&I rate spread, suggesting 
merger activity has become more responsive to capital constraints, or that the stickiness of 
economic decision-making has decreased with increased digitalization. Unlike Harford (2005), 
we do not find that the market-to-book ratio proxy for capital liquidity, but overall evidence 
suggests that the ratio captures valuations rather than misvaluations, also consistent with the 
neoclassical narrative. In the aggregate, merger waves are driven by increased capital liquidity, 
consistent with Harford (2005), who finds that shocks must be accompanied by relaxed capital 
constraints to propagate, causing aggregate waves to form as industry waves cluster in time, 
even if the shocks do not.  
In conclusion, we find that economic, deregulatory, and technological shocks as well as capital 
liquidity drive merger waves, rather than managerial attempts to exploit temporary 
misvaluations to time the takeover market (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004). However, as many industries have become more agile, are already 
deregulated, and innovating at an increasingly faster pace (making technological shocks more 
continuous), shocks seem to have become less surprising, and increasingly accounted for by 
more anticipatory variables (e.g., market-to-book). Albeit the market-to-book variable is 
claimed by both hypotheses, overall evidence rules in favor of the neoclassical. Although it 
would be disingenuous to claim that no mergers can be motivated by managerial opportunism, 
we find it unlikely that temporary misvaluations persist on a sufficient scale to over time enable 
such fundamental dynamics as merger waves, as temporary misvaluations in efficient markets 
must be just that – temporary. For Hypothesis 1, we therefore accept the null hypothesis and 
conclude that merger waves form in response to neoclassical shocks and propagate when capital 
liquidity is sufficient. Consequently, we reject the alternative behavioral hypothesis, consistent 
with previous research (Harford, 2005). 
Regarding the second hypothesis, we find that the magnitude of capital raised by PE funds are 
associated with aggregate merger waves. Consistent with previous research, we find that PE 
firms predominantly raise funds ex ante and that fundraising activity increase in pre-wave years 
before capital is called for investments as buyers gain momentum in the wave (Axelson et al., 
2009; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). As expected, dry powder increases in periods of low merger 
activity. Capital raised is not robust to controls, suggesting that despite the dramatic increase of 
capital inflow to PE seen over the years, merger waves are still dominated by strategic acquirers 
in the aggregate, consistent with previous research (Maksimovic et al., 2013; Martos-Vila et 
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al., 2019). Therefore, we can only conclude that PE funds participate in merger waves on a 
scale that is significant in the aggregate, rather than driving them. However, our findings are 
sufficient to accept the null hypothesis that capital raised by PE funds is associated with 
aggregate merger waves. 
Finally, our findings suggest that takeover premiums decrease over the course of the wave (c.f. 
Hypothesis 3). Using panel regressions to uncover matching criteria and propensity score 
matching to create an appropriate control group, we compare the evolution of premium 
payments over the wave with a non-wave control group. We find that premiums slightly 
decrease over the course of the wave, with the average premium being 14.3 percent in the first 
year and 12.6 percent in the second. Decreasing market-to-book ratio in the treatment group 
(and increasing in the control group) suggests this is because of decreasing competition for less 
attractive targets, and not due to increasing anticipation effects (Servaes & Tamayo, 2014; Song 
& Walkling, 2000) over the course of the wave. This is consistent with the neoclassical 
presumption that bidders compete fiercely for shock-responsive assets in the merger market. 
Moreover, difference-in-difference regressions suggest takeover premiums decrease over the 
course of the wave, and that the decrease is of almost twice the size towards the end of the 
wave. However, the model is not robust to time and industry fixed effects when controlling for 
all observable control variables. In sum, however, our findings are sufficient to accept the null 
hypothesis that takeover premiums change over the wave. 
Further research is necessary to strengthen the validity of our findings. Albeit we are confident 
in the methods employed, increasing the number of premium observations to obtain a balanced 
panel could add additional robustness to our difference-in-difference analysis. We also 
welcome further research on the influence of committed capital to private equity funds on 
industry merger waves. Albeit aggregate waves are dominated by the sheer magnitude of 
strategic buyers (Maksimovic, et. al., 2013; Martos-Vila, et. al., 2019), this does not exclude 
that private equity can drive within-industry waves in appropriate industries (Harford et al., 
2016), but testing this presumption necessitates more granular data. We therefore leave this 
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8. Appendix 













Annual capital raised, capital called for investment and accumulated dry powder by private equity funds in 
USD billions. Additionally, number of active funds in the U.S. and the average size of these are presented. 
Moreover, dry powder and capital raised scaled by total market capitalization of all U.S. based public 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stock Market and OTCQX U.S. Market is 
presented. Lastly, annual capital called scaled by total transaction value within our sample is tabulated.   
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Various news articles, consultancy reports and company statements are researched and used to further 
understand the industry conditions that lead to consolidation within the previously discovered merger waves. 
 
 








 Page 87 of 106  
A.3 Capital Liquidity and Behavioral Variables Correlation Matrix 
 





Fig. A.4. Time series relationship between Residual Value to Paid in Capital (RVPI), Distribution to Paid in 
Capital (DPI) and the Called-up ratio, all of which in percentage points. The RVPI is the fair market value 
of alle the assets owned by the fund divided by LP contributions net of carry/performance fees. DPI is the 
distributed capital to LPs net of carry/performance fees divided by LP contributions. The called ratio is the 
percentage of LP contributions that has been called for investment. All the above variables are defined and 
calculated by Preqin (2018). 
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Another noteworthy discovery is the recent increase in the number of active funds. This is 
particularly evident when we examine the characteristics of the median private equity fund over 
time as is illustrated in Figure A.4. It is hard to draw concrete conclusions regarding the state 
of the industry from this graph given that it only expresses the state of the median PE fund at 
each point in time. The conclusions we can draw, however, are the following: The median PE 
fund in year 2000 had already invested 100 percent of its committed capital. Furthermore, it 
distributed approximately 140 percent of that capital back to the LPs and had 0 percent of the 
capital called in active investments. Thus, the median private equity fund 20 years ago was at 
a late stage in its limited lifecycle. Fast-forward to 2019, the picture is quite different. The 
median PE fund is distributing 0 percent of committed capital back to LPs, it has only called 15 
percent of its committed capital for investment and the estimated RVPI is close to 100 percent 
meaning no additional value creation, for limited partners at least, has occurred yet. This is not 
the same as saying PE funds on aggregate are less profitable or struggle with investing their 
committed capital. However, it does tell us that the current reality for the median fund is quite 
different today than it was 20 years ago. There is clearly an increase in the number of new 
funds, and they are likely battling it out for the same targets leading to increased competition, 
potential increases in transaction activity and perhaps increasing takeover premiums. 
A.5: Principal Component Analysis Properties 
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A.6: VIF-Scores for Logit and OSL Models in Table 7 
 
 
A.7 Autocorrelation Plots for OLS Models (Table 7) 
These plots illustrate Durbin Watson Tests for autocorrelation of residuals in Table 7, Column 
5, 6 and 7, respectively.  
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A.8: VIF-Scores for Modified LPM and OSL Models for industry and Aggregate merger 
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A.9 Autocorrelation Plots for Modified Models (Table 7.1) 
These plots illustrate Durbin Watson Tests for autocorrelation of residuals in Table 7.1, Column 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, respectively.  
 
 
















 Page 94 of 106  
















A.10: Time series development in the proportion of transactions constituted by strictly stock and cash offers 
or a mix of the two. The sample used are the same as the one used to uncover M&A waves.  We start with 
the same sample as before, every M&A transaction with a deal value above $50 million between January 
1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2019. Of the 36 084 transactions in total, 21 744 were strictly cash offers, 
another 2 053 were strictly stock offers while 2 488 used a mix of the two. According to SDC, the remaining 
9 799 transactions had undisclosed, unknown or some other form of consideration offered, and are, therefore, 
excluded. There is obviously a bias arising from this exclusion if, for whatever reason, deals of a certain 
consideration type more often than others are undisclosed. However, we see no immediate solution to this 
problem, and will have to assume that the exclusions are somewhat evenly distributed between the three deal 
types. 
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A.11: Payment Method on the Wave vs. Off the Wave  
 
 








A.13: Propensity Score Matching Between Treatment and Control Group 
 
 
A.11: Payment method composition for transactions taking place during an industry merger wave and during 
non-wave periods. Black pillars illustrate the composition on the wave, while the grey pillars illustrate the 
composition off the wave.  
A.12: If a linear model contains categorical coefficients, i.e., years in Column 2, the generalized variance-
inflation factors, GVIF (Fox & Monette, 1992), are calculated instead of VIF-scores. To compare across 
different degrees of freedom an adjustment, (GVIF^(1/(2*Df)), is used. The rule of thumb used by us is that 
this value squared should be lower than 10. For Column 3 and 4, the high number of categorical variables 
makes the calculation of VIF insensible, thus they are not reported.  
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A.15 Industry Classification 
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